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 ABSTRACT 
 
The current world geopolitical situation has resulted in an ever increasing number of 
third-world nations and terrorists states gaining access to advanced military technology and 
weaponry that was previously limited to first-world nations. The blue water and littoral areas that 
are the operational environments of the United States and Coalition naval forces are within range 
of capable enemy missile systems as was evident in the attacks on the United States Ship Stark 
by Iraq in 1987 and the Israeli Naval Ship Hanit by Hezbollah in July 2006 
Given the increasing threat of Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles (ASCM), the complete 
integration of an effective Electronic Warfare system into the combat systems of U.S. and 
Coalition maritime forces is paramount.  Research has shown that this integration must include a 
computer-aided human element in the decision process. 
The project objective was to develop an improved Electronic Warfare architecture with a 
complete range of automated operation using a Human-In-the-Loop that could be integrated into 
existing and future combat systems. A model was developed that demonstrates solutions that 
integrate hard-kill defensive systems with soft-kill subsystems, managed by a human, in order to 
provide a completely integrated capability to defend against land, air, and sea-launched ASCMs.  
 
       iii
 TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
ABSTRACT................................................................................................................................... iii 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ............................................................................................................ 1 
I. INTRODUCTION................................................................................................................... 2 
A. ASCM DEFENSE DEVELOPMENT BACKGROUND ...................................................... 2 
B. PROBLEM ASSESSMENT................................................................................................... 3 
1. History of Anti-Ship Missile Attacks .................................................................................. 3 
C. BACKGROUND AND PROBLEM ASSESSMENT.......................................................... 10 
D. RESULTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ......................................................................... 10 
E. REPORT OVERVIEW......................................................................................................... 11 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW .................................................................................................. 12 
A. ANTI-SHIP CRUISE MISSILE DEFENSE (ASCMD) ...................................................... 12 
1. ASCM Threat Assessment ................................................................................................ 12 
2. Future Developments......................................................................................................... 17 
B. HUMAN SYSTEMS INTEGRATION (HSI) ...................................................................... 18 
1. Levels of Automation ........................................................................................................ 18 
2. Historical Example ............................................................................................................ 20 
3. Ethical and Political Implications...................................................................................... 20 
III. TECHNICAL APPROACH .............................................................................................. 22 
A. STAKEHOLDERS............................................................................................................... 22 
1. Definitions and Customers ................................................................................................ 22 
2. Stakeholder Requirements................................................................................................. 24 
B. SHIP DEFENSIVE CAPABILITY GAPS........................................................................... 25 
C. GENERAL ASSUMPTIONS............................................................................................... 27 
D. SYSTEMS ENGINEERING DESIGN PROCESS.............................................................. 27 
IV. DESIGN AND ANALYSIS .............................................................................................. 32 
A. KEY CAPABILITIES.......................................................................................................... 32 
B. BATTLESPACE DEFINITION........................................................................................... 34 
1. Definitions ......................................................................................................................... 34 
2. Battlespace Scenarios ........................................................................................................ 35 
3. Design Parameters ............................................................................................................. 36 
C. CONCEPTUAL DESIGN .................................................................................................... 44 
1. Base Case Model ............................................................................................................... 44 
2. HITL Models ..................................................................................................................... 47 
D. CURRENT AND PROPOSED SOLUTION ANALYSIS .................................................. 51 
1.  Analysis of Models Outputs ............................................................................................. 51 
V. CONCLUSION.................................................................................................................. 64 
1. Findings ............................................................................................................................. 64 
2. Recommendations ............................................................................................................. 65 
Appendix A - References.............................................................................................................. 66 
Appendix B - Acronyms ............................................................................................................... 71 
Appendix C - Emulator Software Selection.................................................................................. 73 
Appendix D – Modeling and Simulation Results ......................................................................... 75 
1. Base Case Light Results .................................................................................................... 75 
2. Base Case Heavy Results .................................................................................................. 79 
       iv
 3. HITL 4 Second Response Light Time Results .................................................................. 83 
4. HITL 4 Second Response Heavy Time Results ................................................................ 88 
5. HITL 6 Second Response Heavy Time Results ................................................................ 95 
6. Integrated HITL 0 second Delay Case IEW.................................................................... 104 
7. Integrated HITL 4 second Delay Case IEW.................................................................... 110 
8. Integrated HITL 6 second Delay Case IEW.................................................................... 116 
Appendix E – Team Introduction and Composition ................................................................... 122 
Initial Distribution List ............................................................................................................... 124 
 
       v
 LIST OF FIGURES 
 
Figure 1: The INS Eilat (Anon. 12 2008). ...................................................................................... 4 
Figure 2:  Damage to the HMS Sheffield (Anon. 02). .................................................................... 5 
Figure 3:  Damage to the MV Atlantic Conveyor (Anon. 25). ....................................................... 6 
Figure 4:  Damage to the HMS Glamorgan (Anon. 04 2008). ....................................................... 7 
Figure 5:  Damage to the USS Stark (Anon. 19 1987). .................................................................. 8 
Figure 6:  Damage to INS Hanit (Anon. 14 2008). ........................................................................ 9 
Figure 7:  Excerpt from Systems Engineering and Analysis, Fourth Edition............................... 29 
Figure 8:  DTE Sequence.............................................................................................................. 34 
Figure 9:  OV-1 System Operational Concept.............................................................................. 36 
Figure 10:  Base Case Model. ....................................................................................................... 46 
Figure 11:  Base Case HITL Model.............................................................................................. 48 
Figure 12:  Integrated Base Case/HITL Model............................................................................. 50 
Figure 13:  Base Case and HITL response time summaries. ........................................................ 56 
Figure 14:  Average FSR Number Out. ........................................................................................ 58 
Figure 15:  Average HITL Delay times in seconds. ..................................................................... 58 
Figure 16:  Average FSR Time Totals in seconds. ....................................................................... 59 
Figure 17:  Average hard kill numbers hit. ................................................................................... 59 
Figure 18:  Average hard kill numbers missed. ............................................................................ 60 
Figure 19:  Average EW numbers hit. .......................................................................................... 60 
Figure 20:  Average EW numbers balked..................................................................................... 61 
Figure 21:  Semi-Automatic Sensor System................................................................................. 62 
Figure 22:  Automatic Sensor System. ......................................................................................... 63 





       vi
 LIST OF TABLES 
 
Table 1:  Potential ASCM Threats................................................................................................ 16 
Table 2:  Recreation of Table 1, Levels of Automation of Decision and Action Selection. ........ 19 
Table 3:  Stakeholder Requirements. ............................................................................................ 24 
Table 4:  Base Case Parameters. ................................................................................................... 37 
Table 5:  Base Case Model Processes........................................................................................... 38 
Table 6:  HITL Model Parameters. ............................................................................................... 39 
Table 7:  HITL Model processes. ................................................................................................. 40 
Table 8:  HITL Reaction Times. ................................................................................................... 41 
Table 9:  Integrated Base Case / HITL Model Parameters. .......................................................... 42 
Table 10:  Integrated Base Case/ HITL Model Processes and Parameters Part 1. ....................... 43 
Table 11:  Integrated Base Case/ HITL Model Processes and Parameters Part 2. ....................... 44 
Table 12:  System Response Performance.................................................................................... 51 
Table 13:  Base Case HITL Model Analysis. ............................................................................... 52 
Table 14:  Percent Balk................................................................................................................. 54 





       vii








THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
The current world geopolitical situation has resulted in an ever-increasing number of 
third-world nations and terrorists states gaining access to advanced military technology and 
weaponry that was previously limited to first-world nations. The blue water and littoral areas that 
are the operational environments of the United States and Coalition naval forces are within range 
of capable enemy missile systems missile systems originating from land, air, and sea platforms 
as was evident in the attacks on the United States Ship Stark by Iraq in 1987 and the Israeli 
Naval Ship Hanit by Hezbollah in July 2006 
Given the increasing threat presented by Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles, the complete 
integration of effective Electronic Warfare systems into the current combat systems of United 
States and Coalition maritime forces is paramount.  This integration must include a computer-
aided human element in a decision process designed to engage and neutralize an Anti-Ship 
Cruise Missile.  
The objective of this project was to develop an improved, advanced Electronic Warfare 
architecture with a complete range of automated operation using a Human-In-the-Loop (HITL) 
that could be integrated into existing and future combat systems.  
Several models were developed simulating an integrated Electronic Warfare architecture. 
The integrated architecture incorporated a complete range of automation from total automation to 
manual operation using a Human-In-the-Loop to aid in Situational Awareness in combat. The 
model developed with Rockwell’s Arena enabled evaluation of solutions that integrate hard-kill 
defensive systems with soft-kill Electronic Warfare subsystems in order to provide a completely 
integrated capability to defend against land, air, and sea-launched Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles. 
Among the findings of the study was that only a few seconds of delay for HITL 
involvement can be tolerated.  Based on estimated times for HITL actions, under the most 
stressing scenario, the system should present the human decision maker with only the option to 
veto or not veto continued operation before automatic threat prosecution takes place. 
       1
 I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs) are an ever-increasing threat to both military and 
commercial shipping worldwide.  In the last fifty years there have been several attacks on United 
States (US) and foreign ships by ASCMs.  The first recorded lethal attack was on the Israeli 
Naval Ship (INS) Eilat in 1967 resulting in 47 deaths.  Since the first use of Electronic Warfare 
(EW) in a battle between missile-equipped boats at the Battle of Latakia in 1973 (Anon. 12 
2009),  EW systems have evolved greatly, but have yet to become fully integrated into the 
overall ship’s weapon systems.  With ASCM capabilities improving, the need for more timely 
responses has become paramount.  The evolution and integration of EW systems with existing 
weapon systems has become an increasingly important part of ship defensive capabilities.  In his 
1988 book Naval Electronic Warfare, Dr. D. G. Kiely wrote: 
Further evolution may lead to [EW] being absorbed into a complete ship weapons 
system, largely software controlled, which is designed from the outset as a single entity 
using as ingredients the capabilities of the separate sensors and weapons of today.  This 
trend in system design is virtually inevitable.  In the future there will not be enough time 
in major operations for men to assess the tactical situation from sensor information and 
then decide to commit weapons to individual threats.  What is likely to occur is the 
creation of a total ship system where the sensor information is appraised by software and 
weapons, decoys, and other ECM measures are deployed automatically. 
 
The objective of this endeavor is the development of a solution to improve the integration 
of EW systems into the weapons systems architecture onboard the United States Navy (USN) 
21st Century Warship.  Currently, EW systems must use one or more Human-In-The-Loop 
(HITL) in order for threats to be prosecuted.  At times, this method can be slow and 
cumbersome.  The proposed architecture will change the way the HITL is employed by further 
automating the threat resolution process and determining the method, whether soft-kill, hard-kill, 
or both to use that will defeat threats while meeting the current Rules of Engagement (ROE) for 
deployed units. 
A. ASCM DEFENSE DEVELOPMENT BACKGROUND 
 
At the tip of the spear, the USN protects national security by maintaining a high level of 
readiness to preserve freedom of the seas.  A major threat to the survivability of our naval force 
is the ASCM.  These can be generally categorized as either subsonic, with speeds up to Mach 
0.9, or supersonic, with speeds of Mach 1.0 and above.  These missiles typically fly at low 
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 altitudes to avoid detection and are the principle threat to the navies of the United States and her 
Coalition partners.  These missiles are highly capable of destroying naval surface ships, as 
demonstrated in the attack on the United States Ship (USS) Stark in 1987, and can be deployed 
from air, surface, subsurface, and land units (Raytheon Company 2007, 2). 
The decision to engage with the correct weapon must be made quickly once a threat has 
been detected.  The situation on the USS Stark involved decision making that centered on 
multiple people in the engagement loop.  Had the Electronic Warfare System (EWS) been 
completely integrated with the combat systems on the platform, the attack might have been 
averted.  It was evident that the Navy needed a better way to combat the threat of ASCMs in 
littoral waters.  In the early 1990’s, the USN began research and development on systems that 
would change the current “Detect to Engage” (DTE) sequence that had been in use long before 
the attack on the USS Stark.  The Navy needed a means of incorporating threat inputs from 
multiple on and off board sensors to neutralize those threats using currently deployed weapon 
systems.  Parallel systems development took place in an effort to minimize the threat.  The first 
objective of the new system was to identify and categorize the threat.  Once identified as a 
positive threat, the system would use computerized doctrine to assign either a soft or hard-kill 
system to counter the threat.  
B. PROBLEM ASSESSMENT 
        1. History of Anti-Ship Missile Attacks 
 a.  INS Eilat 
The first anti-ship missile attack recorded was on the INS Eilat.  The INS Eilat was a 
Z-class destroyer, originally christened Her Majesty’s Ship (HMS) Zealous.  She served in the 
Royal Navy (RN) during World War II and was later sold to Israel in 1955 where she was re-
commissioned as INS Eilat.  During the Suez Crisis on 31 October 1956, Eilat participated in the 
attack on the Egyptian destroyer Ibrahim al-Awal.  Eilat later served in the War of Attrition, 
which took place between Egypt and Israel between 1967 and 1970.  Between 11 and 12 July 
1967, Eilat attacked and destroyed two Egyptian torpedo boats in conjunction with two Israeli 
torpedo boats.  On October 21 1967, while on routine patrol off of Port Said in the 
Mediterranean, Eilat came under attack by Egyptian missile boats that were still anchored in 
port. 
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 The first attack came when an Egyptian Komar-class missile boat fired two Russian 
SS-N-2 Styx missiles at Eilat.  The missiles were detected just prior to their impact with the ship, 
making defensive maneuvers impossible.  The first missile struck just above the waterline, and 
the second missile struck two minutes later in the same location.  The ship sustained heavy 
damage and began listing.  Eilat was attacked by a second Komar-class missile boat 
approximately an hour to an hour and a half after the first attack, again with Styx missiles, and 
sank ten minutes later.  Of her complement of 191 sailors, forty seven were killed as a result of 




Figure 1: The INS Eilat (Anon. 12 2008). 
The Israeli destroyer INS Eilat steaming in an undisclosed location prior to the Egyptian Komar-class boat attacks 
that fired SS-N-2 Styx missiles and sank her. 
 
b.  The Falklands War 
In 1982 three attacks were recorded.  The first was an Argentinean attack on the RN 
destroyer HMS Sheffield.  This is a prime example of the issues faced when confronting the anti-
ship cruise missile threat.  The HMS Sheffield, hull number D80, was a Type 42 guided missile 
destroyer, similar in function to the United States Spruance or Arleigh Burke class guided missile 
destroyers.  Embarking with 287 sailors, the Sheffield was part of the British Task Force that 
took part in the Falklands War in 1982.  On the morning of 4 May 1982, Sheffield was on station 
after relieving her sister ship, HMS Coventry.  Sheffield and Coventry were communicating via 
       4
 Ultra High-Frequency (UHF) radio when she detected incoming missiles on her Type 965 radar.  
The missiles were French designed Exocet anti-ship missiles.  The launching aircraft, two 
Argentine Super Étendards, flying from Rio Grande, Tierra del Fuego Naval Air Base, were 
never detected.  The missiles impacted the ship only seconds after being detected. 
The first Exocet impacted Sheffield amidships, approximately 8 feet above the waterline 
on the second deck while the second missile fell short of the ship and landed in the ocean.  It is 
unclear if the warhead detonated or not, but significant damage was caused.  The unexpended 
rocket fuel in the missile was ignited, starting fires that ravaged the ship.  Twenty sailors were 
killed as a result of the attack.   The fires were successfully extinguished and the ship was taken 
into tow by HMS Yarmouth on 10 May; however, high seas caused slow flooding of the ship and 




Figure 2:  Damage to the HMS Sheffield (Anon. 02). 
The HMS Sheffield engulfed in flames after being struck by two Argentine-launched Exocet missiles. 
 
Another ship to fall to the power of the anti-ship missile was the Merchant Vessel (MV) 
Atlantic Conveyor.  The Atlantic Conveyor was a British merchant navy ship requisitioned by the 
Ministry of Defence (MOD) during the Falklands War to function in a support role, ferrying 
supplies from the United Kingdom (UK) to the Falklands.  Due to her not being a military ship, 
she was not fitted with any kind of active or passive defensive capability and relied on the ships 
around her for protection.  On 25 May 1982, the Atlantic Conveyor came under attack by 
Argentine Super Étendard aircraft armed with Exocet anti-ship missiles in much the same way as 
       5
 the HMS Sheffield before her.  However, unlike the Sheffield, Atlantic Conveyor was not the 
intended target of the attack.  The Argentine Super Étendards had fired their Exocet missiles at 
ships in the adjoining task force.  The targeted ships successfully deployed chaff 
countermeasures, which caused the missiles to break lock and look for a new target - the Atlantic 
Conveyor. 
Having no ability to defend herself from the incoming threat, the ship was struck on the 
port quarter, and fires started aboard the ship.  Again, it is unclear if the impacting missile’s 
warhead detonated or not.  The embarked cargo of several helicopters and fixed wing aircraft 
were largely destroyed.  After the fires were extinguished, the damage to the ship was deemed 
too great and she was abandoned, later being intentionally sunk.  Twelve sailors were killed as a 




Figure 3:  Damage to the MV Atlantic Conveyor (Anon. 25). 
The MV Atlantic Conveyor on fire after an Argentine Exocet strike during the Falklands war.  
 
The final example from the Falklands War is that of the HMS Glamorgan, hull number 
D19.  She was a County-class destroyer, also part of the British Task Force employed during the 
Falklands War.  On the first of May, 1982, she was unsuccessfully attacked by four Argentine 
Mirage fighter aircrafts using 500 pound bombs, a method that was later successfully employed 
against the frigates HMS Ardent and HMS Antelope.  On the evening of 25 May, after the attack 
on the MV Atlantic Conveyor, Glamorgan participated in retaliatory strikes against the city 
Stanley.  She participated in several additional strikes against Stanley in the following days.  
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 During the afternoon of 30 May Glamorgan came under attack by Exocet missiles, but escaped 
unscathed.  She remained in the area supporting British warfighting efforts, and on the 12th of 
June, she again came under attack by Exocet missiles. 
The attack was carried out by a shore-based Exocet battery.  The incoming missile was 
not detected by shipboard warning systems.  However, seconds before impact, the Exocet 
exhaust plume was detected visually by the Officer of the Watch.  The missile impacted the aft 
end of ship, blowing a hole in the deck outside the hangar, destroying the ships aircraft and the 
port Seacat anti-air missile launcher.  As in other cases, the missile’s warhead did not detonate.  
However, the fires it caused spread throughout the hangar and galley, which was situated below 
the area of impact.  The ship’s magazine and other nearby compartments were flooded, but the 
ship did not sink.  She was temporarily repaired on site and steamed to port under her own power 
in late June.  She continued in service until 1998.  Of 471 embarked sailors, thirteen were killed 




Figure 4:  Damage to the HMS Glamorgan (Anon. 04 2008). 
This is the result after an Exocet strike from a shore battery during the Falklands War.
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 c. USS Stark 
The USS Stark was an Oliver Hazard Perry-class guided missile frigate (FFG) with the 
USN.  With her embarked complement of approximately 230 sailors, she was one of several 
USN ships deployed to the Persian Gulf during the Iran-Iraq war in the late 1980s.  Her mission 
was to protect Kuwaiti oil tankers that had been temporarily reregistered as US vessels in an 
attempt to legally offer them protection while the US remained neutral in the conflict.  The US’s 
neutrality would come at a steep price.  On 17 May 1987, while on patrol in the Persian Gulf, 
Stark came under attack.  Stark was fired on by an Iraqi Mirage F1 fighter aircraft operating out 
of Shaibah.  Similar to previous incidences, the French Exocet missile was not detected on radar 
prior to impact.  The ship’s defensive systems were not made ready and as a result, there was no 
response to the incoming missiles from either the Phalanx Close-In Weapons System (CIWS) or 
onboard countermeasure dispensers.  The first missile penetrated the port side hull and lodged 
itself in the ship, not detonating but starting fires from its still burning rocket motor.  The second 
missile struck moments later, penetrating into the ship and detonating its warhead in crew 
quarters.  While sustaining heavy damage, Stark was temporarily repaired onsite and was able to 
return to port under her own power.  After refurbishment she continued in service until 1999.  
Iraq later stated that the USS Stark had been mistaken by the pilot as an Iranian frigate.  Thirty 
seven sailors were killed as a result of the attack, which was a huge public relations disaster for 




Figure 5:  Damage to the USS Stark (Anon. 19 1987). 
The USS Stark on fire in the Persian Gulf after being struck by an Exocet anti-ship cruise missile. 
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 d.  INS Hanit 
The most recent attack was on the INS Hanit.  The INS Hanit (translated to English as 
“Spear”) is a Sa’ar 5-class corvette that entered service in February of 1995.  She participated in 
operations during the 2006 Lebanon War (also known as the July War or the Second Lebanon 
War) between Lebanon and Israel.  On 14 July 2006, Hanit was engaged in patrol operations in 
Lebanese waters approximately 10 nm off the coast of Beirut, Lebanon.  She was attacked by at 
least one anti-ship missile, suspected to be a sea-skimming Chinese C-802.  The missile 
impacted the ship under the aft superstructure causing damage to the flight deck and propulsion 
systems.  However, Hanit was able to return to port for repairs under her own power.  There is 
conjecture that the ship actually faced a multiple-missile threat, the first being a decoy that 
locked on to its intended target on a similar bearing as Hanit prior to passing over.  It was 
initially believed that a weaponized unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) had been used in the attack.  
Only later was it determined that a rather sophisticated anti-ship missile was the weapon used.  
The possibility of an anti-ship missile attack by Hezbollah militants was not believed likely, thus 
Hanit’s anti-ship missile defenses were not online during the attack.  Of her complement of 74 




Figure 6:  Damage to INS Hanit (Anon. 14 2008). 
While on patrol operations in Lebanese waters INS Hanit was struck by a Hezbollah launched sea-skimming 
Chinese C-802.  Damage was sustained to the flight deck and propulsion systems. 
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 C. BACKGROUND AND PROBLEM ASSESSMENT 
 
There are several lessons learned from the anti-ship cruise missile attacks evaluated 
above.  In general, a combination of factors were in play, however, there are some specific 
factors that can be noted.  In some of the cases, the incoming missiles were not detected in 
enough time to employ defensive measures.  The timeline from detection to engagement, either 
by human or computerized system, was not sufficient to employ defensive systems aboard the 
targeted platform.  In some of the cases, the automated systems that would have detected the 
incoming threats were disabled or operated in a reduced capacity due to interference from other 
shipboard systems.  While the systems were present, they were not implemented in such a way 
that they were effective.  In yet other cases, the defensive systems were not enabled due to 
intelligence suggesting such attacks were unlikely. 
Each of the factors noted above is an issue to both a fully automated system and a system 
with a HITL.  With regard to there not being enough time between detection and employment of 
countermeasures, a HITL will only serve to extend that timeline.  In the case of the systems 
being disabled or operated in a reduced capacity due to interference, it was a human that made 
the decision to limit the system, because it was a human who became annoyed with the alarm 
bells, or flashing lights, alerting them to threats that were not there.  Finally, it was a human who 
ultimately decided not to operate the defensive systems due to intelligence they were provided.  
Thus, a system is necessary that will: detect incoming threats at long range; quickly analyze 
incoming threats to categorize the threat and determine a response; employ countermeasures 
automatically or with limited human oversight; and be electromagnetically compatible with other 
ship systems. 
D. RESULTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
This study has shown that there is a great need for improvement of current Naval ASCM 
defensive techniques, in order to both defend against current threats and to maintain such a 
capability against emerging and evolving threats.  The integration of an advanced electronic 
warfare system to existing surface combatant defensive systems will enable current and future 
Naval surface combatants to effectively combat the ASCM threat. 
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 It is recommended that an integrated electronic warfare system be developed with a HITL 
in an oversight role.  A significant output of this study was the development of a model for 
ASCM engagement.  The model currently incorporates nominal unclassified parameters for both 
the ASCM threat systems and the necessary human performance parameters.  It is further 
recommended that the model be expanded upon, both in fidelity and depth of detail.  
E. REPORT OVERVIEW 
 
The remainder of this report contains four sections; Literature Review, Technical 
Approach, Design and Analysis, and Conclusion.  The background concerning the threat has 
been established the literature review section which provides information on current threat 
capabilities, ship capability gaps, and the importance of carefully considering the implementation 
of the HITL.  The third section, Technical Approach, describes the team’s work transforming 
stakeholder needs into functional needs and presents the systems engineering approach for the 
project.  It describes how the team modeled and simulated the problem.  The Design and 
Analysis chapter assessed current and projected system capabilities to define the potential 
battlespace.  A conceptual design was proposed and evaluated against the current design.  
Finally, conclusions are presented and recommendations made in the final chapter. 
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 II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The literature review portion of this report focuses on the ASCM threat and human 
systems integration.  For the ASCM threat, past, present and future ASCMs are reviewed.  Their 
performance characteristics, such as speed, terminal attack type, velocity, propulsion and 
guidance types, and typical launch platforms are presented.  In addition, known future ASCM 
developments are discussed.  When the past and present threats are combined with knowledge 
about future technologies and example attacks discussed in Chapter I, methods to counter the 
threats can be devised.  Further, human systems integration (HSI) is also discussed.  Integration 
of man and machine is imperative to achieve the response times necessary to counter the ASCM 
threat.  Levels of computer automation will be explored, and historical information on 
human/machine interaction in similar combat systems will be examined. 
 
A. ANTI-SHIP CRUISE MISSILE DEFENSE (ASCMD) 
        1. ASCM Threat Assessment 
 
The primary driver for ship self defense is ASCMs.  A comparison of some of those 
missiles and their capabilities is necessary to better understand the requirements of the Integrated 
EW on the ships.  These capabilities include country of origin, propulsion type, velocity, 
guidance type and warhead type.   
There are currently six primary nations that produce ASCMs for sale to other countries; 
the United States, Russia, China, India, France, and North Korea.  The US produces the 
A/R/UGM-84 Harpoon.  The Harpoon, manufactured by Boeing (formerly McDonnell Douglas) 
Integrated Defense Systems in St. Charles, Missouri, achieved operational capability in 1977 and 
is employed by the USN, United States Air Force (USAF), and 27 foreign countries through 
foreign military sales.  The Harpoon is available in the following variants: Air-to-Ground 
(AGM-84), Surface-to-Surface (RGM-84), and Subsurface-to-Surface Missile (UGM-84).  Each 
is powered in flight by a liquid-fueled jet engine, with the surface and submarine-launched 
variants having an additional booster rocket engine.  The Harpoon is a sea-skimming missile 
with a terminal pop-up maneuver utilizing an Inertial Navigation System (INS) and an active 
radar terminal seeker to locate its target.  It cruises at high subsonic speeds with a range in excess 
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 of 67 miles and carries a conventional high explosive warhead of 488 lbs.  The Harpoon Block II 
adds global positioning system (GPS) capability to complement the INS (Anon. 10 2009). 
Russia produces three ASCM variants.  The first is the P-15 Termit, alternatively known 
by its North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) reporting name SS-N-2 Styx or 4K40.  The 
Styx is manufactured by the MKB Raduga design bureau.  It achieved operational capability in 
1960 and is employed by many countries, including Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, and North Korea.  It is 
available in air, surface, and ground-launched variants, and is as the basis for derivative weapons 
from several other countries, including China, Iran, and North Korea.  The Styx is a rocket 
powered, sea-skimming missile that is capable of cruising at high subsonic speeds with a range 
in excess of 50 miles.  It carries a conventional 1,100 lb high-explosive anti-tank (HEAT) 
warhead, as opposed to the more common semi-armor piercing warheads typical of anti-ship 
missiles.  It uses active radar for terminal guidance with some variants having a supplemental 
infrared (IR) guidance system (Anon. 06 2009). 
 Another Russian ASCM is the P-270 Moskit, alternatively known by its NATO reporting 
name SS-N-22 Sunburn, which is designed by the same bureau as the Styx.  The Sunburn 
achieved operational capability in the late 1970s and is also employed by China, Vietnam, and 
Iran.  The Sunburn is available in air, surface, submarine and ground-launched variants.  The 
Sunburn is a sea skimming missile that uses a ramjet with booster rocket for launch.  It cruises at 
Mach 2 to 3, and has a range between 56 and 155 miles, depending on the particular variant.  It 
carries a conventional 700 lb warhead and uses an active radar seeker for terminal guidance 
(Pike 2006d). 
The final ASCM produced by Russia is the 3M54 Klub, alternatively known by its 
NATO reporting name SS-N-27 Sizzler.  The Sizzler is manufactured by the Novator Design 
Bureau and was shown to the public in 1997 with variants known to be also employed by China, 
India, and Algeria.  It is available in surface and submarine-launched variants, though an air-
launched version may be in development.  The Sizzler is a sea-skimming missile that cruises at 
high subsonic speed and has a supersonic dash capability for the terminal phase.  It has a range 
of 140 miles and carries a 440 lb conventional warhead.  The Sizzler uses inertial navigation with 
an active radar seeker for terminal guidance (Rakshak 2006). 
 Similarly to Russia, China produces several ASCMs.  The C-801, alternatively known as 
the Ying-Ji (YJ) 1 or by its NATO reporting name CSS-N-4 Sardine, is a Chinese anti-ship 
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 missile manufactured by China Haiying Electromechanical Technology Academy (CHETA).  It 
is known to be employed also by Iran.  The Sardine is available in air, surface, submarine and 
ground-launched variants.  The Sardine is powered by a rocket engine and uses a booster rocket 
for launch.  The Sardine is a sea-skimming missile believed to be derived from the French 
Exocet. It cruises at high subsonic speeds and has a range of 26 miles.  It carries a conventional 
360 lb high explosive semi-armor piercing warhead and uses an active radar seeker for terminal 
guidance (Pike 2006a). 
 The C-802, alternatively known as the YJ-802 or by its NATO reporting name CSS-N-8 
Saccade, is a Chinese anti-ship missile manufactured by CHETA.  It achieved operational 
capability in 1989 and is employed by many other countries, including Algeria, Bangladesh, 
Iran, and Pakistan.  The Saccade is available in air, surface, submarine and ground-launched 
variants.  The Saccade is a jet engine powered, sea-skimming missile that attacks low on the 
target’s waterline.  It cruises at high subsonic speeds and has a supersonic terminal phase.  The 
Saccade has a range of between 75 and 310 miles, and carries a conventional 363-lb high 
explosive semi-armor piercing warhead utilizing inertial navigation with an active radar seeker 
for terminal guidance.  IR and electro-optical (EO) seeker upgrades are known to be available 
(Pike 2006b).  
The Russian SS-N-2 Styx missile provided the basis for several Chinese anti-ship 
missiles, including the HY-1, CSS-C-2 Silkworm, HY-2, HY-3, CSS-C-3 Seersucker, and HY-4.  
They are in use by multiple countries including China, Iran, North Korea, Sudan, and the United 
Arab Emirates (UAE).  This family of missiles is available in air, surface, and ground-launched 
variants.  Variants are powered by rocket, ramjet (HY-3), or jet (HY-4) engines with booster 
rockets used for launch.  They are sea-skimming missiles with a terminal dive attack and a range 
of 60 miles carrying a conventional 1,130 lb warhead.  Guidance types vary from IR to active 
radar to monopulse radar (Anon. 11 2009). 
 India has one ASCM, the PJ-10 BrahMos.  The PJ-10 BrahMos is a joint effort between 
the Indian Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO) and Russian NPO 
Mashinostroeyenia.  Achieving operational capability in 2006, it is employed by India and 
Russia.  The BrahMos is available in air, surface, submarine and ground-launched variants.  The 
BrahMos uses an integrated rocket and ramjet engine for launch and cruise.  It is a sea-skimming 
missile, which carries a conventional 660 lb semi-armor piercing warhead, capable of cruising at 
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 supersonic speeds between Mach 2.8 and 3.0 with a range of 180 miles.  A hypersonic, Mach 5.0 
and above, variant is under development and has been demonstrated in a laboratory environment.  
It uses inertial navigation with GPS and has an active radar seeker for terminal guidance (Anon. 
07 ). 
The Exocet is a French anti-ship missile manufactured by the Aérospatiale division of 
MBDA.  It achieved operational capability in 1972 and is employed by many different countries 
including Pakistan, Argentina, Egypt, and Iraq.  It is available in air, surface and submarine-
launched variants, and has been adapted for ground-based launches as well.  It uses a booster 
rocket engine for launch and a rocket or jet engine for cruising.  It is a sea-skimming missile that 
cruises at high subsonic speed and has a range of 110 miles.  The Exocet carries a conventional 
360 lb shaped-charge warhead and uses inertial navigation with active radar for terminal 
guidance (Anon. 09). 
 The KN-01 is a North Korean variant of the Russian SS-N-2 Styx anti-ship missile.  It has 
been test fired extensively from 1993 to today.  The KN-01 has been displayed at trade shows 
mounted to ground-launch vehicles and has a demonstrated range of 65 miles.  Little is known 
about its warhead, engine, or range, though these are likely to be similar to the capabilities of the 
Styx (Pike 2005; Jane’s Information Group 2008). 
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Table 1:  Potential ASCM Threats. 
A table of potential ASCMs that would have to be defended against and their respective attributes. Most of these 
missiles are operated by more than one country. 
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         2. Future Developments 
 
Future ASCM development is focused toward improving upon existing technologies and 
designs, rather than implementing revolutionary capabilities.  The major areas for increased 
capabilities are seeker technology, range, speed, and stealth.  Some capabilities are being 
improved in tandem, such as speed and range, while others are interrelated, such as the use of 
advanced passive sensors to improve stealth.  There are upcoming weapons geared toward 
providing increased capabilities for conflicts in littoral waters.  Such weapons will use advanced 
seeker hardware and algorithms to improve their performance in high-clutter environments 
(Defense Update 2007). 
Other weapons are being developed with a focus on increased range, allowing attacking 
craft to employ their weapons at greater distances, outside of weapon and/or detection range of 
the target ship (Defense Update 2009; FBO Daily 2008).  
In addition, systems are being developed with an eye on decreasing probability of 
detection.  Through the use of composite materials, passive guidance technologies, and particular 
body shapes, weapons can be made increasingly stealthy, much as aircraft have become.  This 
will allow the weapons to more readily be employed without being detected, and will lower the 
potential response time the target ship has available to employ countermeasures (Scott 2006).  
Additional improvements are being made in propulsion, with mixed mode jet/rocket 
systems, higher sustained speeds, and terminal phase dash attacks all increasing probability of 
kill while decreasing probability of detection.  In addition improvements to existing weapons are 
being made to increase flight speeds into the hypersonic regime.  These potential improvements 
highlight the importance of eliminating ship defensive capability gaps (Anon. 18 2008). 
Advancing technologies have led to four major types of weapons from a flight speed 
perspective.  First, there are the subsonic missiles that cruise below Mach 1 for the duration of 
their flights.  Next there are the supersonic missiles.  These accelerate to and cruise in the Mach 
1 to Mach 2 speed range for the duration of their flights.  In addition, there are those weapons 
that have a terminal phase that is much faster than their cruise phase.  To date these missile 
typically cruise at subsonic speeds and have a supersonic terminal phase.  Finally, there are the 
hypersonic weapons, which are the newest class, of which none are known to be currently 
fielded.  The BrahMos II is the first of these weapons, cruising at up to and over Mach 3.  In 
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 order to defend against all these types of weapons, it is necessary to be able to defend against the 
fastest – those being the hypersonic class weapons. 
B. HUMAN SYSTEMS INTEGRATION (HSI) 
 
The International Council of System Engineering (INCOSE) defines HSI as the 
“interdisciplinary technical and management processes for integrating human considerations 
within and across all system elements; an essential enabler to systems engineering practice” (HSI 
Working Group 2007).   
In 2008 the Duncan Hunter National Authorization Act recognized the importance of 
including HSI in all DoD acquisition programs (Washington, DC: ODUSD(A&T), 
ODUSD(S&T) Director of Biological Systems 2009)  The design of the Integrated Electronic 
Warfare Systems (IEWS) will incorporate HSI according to policy standards set forth in the DoD 
and Navy HSI management plans.   
        1. Levels of Automation   
 
The original intent of the project team was to create a completely automated, integrated 
EW system that would be considered for the combat systems of the next generation of 21st 
Century warships.  The initial thought was that a fully automated EW system, without HITL, was 
needed to minimize system response time.  After much discussion it became apparent that 
Situational Awareness (SA), specifically the need to discriminate between friend or foe, was a 
considerable issue and that the human could not be disconnected from the process altogether.  
The level of human and machine interaction then became the central focusing issue.  The 
question of how much human activity versus how much automation to employ became 
paramount to the research on the integration of the system as a whole.  To characterize levels of 
HITL activity, we have selected the ten levels of automation, taken from the research of 
Parasuraman, Sheridan, and Wickens.  Table 2 shows the ten levels of interaction that the human 
and the computer could have (Parasuraman, Sheridan, and Wickens 2000, 286).  These levels 
span a range from only human decisions and actions to no human decision or actions taken 
during the DTE sequence.   















Table 2:  Recreation of Table 1, Levels of Automation of Decision and Action Selection. 
This table was taken from A Model for Types and Levels of Human Interaction with Automation (Parasuraman, 
Sheridan, and Wickens 2000, 286).  These 10 levels indicate the amount of interaction between a human operator 
and the system.  Low indicates that the human user will make all the decisions and take subsequent actions.  High 
indicates that the human will have zero input into the DTE sequence and the system acts autonomously. 
 
The human considerations of the system are every bit as important and challenging as the 
hardware and software portion of the system.  The HSI domains found on the Naval Postgraduate 
School (NPS) website include human factors engineering, human survivability, system safety, 
health hazards, habitability, manpower, personnel, and training (Naval Postgraduate School 
2009). The simulation has randomized small differences in reaction time to emulate the 
differences in skill and attention levels of personnel at any given time.  During the development 
of the models, human factors engineering, human survivability, system safety concerns were 
addressed throughout the levels of human interaction.  For the levels that require human 
interaction the degree and time of these interactions has been varied with the system.  This 
variation could range from a simple query of the system to the human completing some or all 
decisions and actions.  Each level of automation is assigned a specific time in the model 
simulating the delay time that would be expected if a human was a part of the kill chain.  At the 
four second mark the operator may press a button to veto the automatic solution presented by the 
system.  At 15 seconds, the operator may be given multiple alternatives to chose from. At 30 
seconds, the system could be switched to a manual mode of operation.  The design took into 
consideration the complete range of human interaction that may occur during the operation of the 
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 IEWS that would improve the overall SA of the watch stander while conducting engagement 
support or counter targeting. 
Three primary assumptions applied to the simulation presented in subsequent chapters 
concerned Manpower, Personnel, and Training.  It was assumed that while the personnel 
maintaining the system may or may not be military, the HITL would be military.  The second 
assumption involved the fact that increased automation would reduce the numbers of military 
personnel necessary to operate the system, but may also increase the need for regular testing and 
maintenance.  The third assumption made was that the Navy would apply stringent qualifications 
to the training program for operators and would limit the position of operator to members in a 
supervisory position with the authority to release weapons.  Health hazards and habitability 
domains were not addressed in this project. 
        2. Historical Example 
 
There has been much attention called to HITL issues.  Many published articles discuss 
the USS Vincennes incident on July 3, 1988 in the Persian Gulf.  While most of the literature 
maintains that the incident could have been avoided, it focuses on the fact that in war time, life 
and death decisions must be made instantaneously without clear or available information.  The 
question asked after this incident by the press was phrased very well by a writer for Time 
magazine.  “The central question is whether technology may be pushing the fallible humans who 
operate it beyond their ability to make wise judgments instantly on the basis of what, with even 
the most sophisticated systems, will often be ambiguous info” (Church, Jackson/Tehran, and 
Peterzell/Washington 1988).  The factors that led to the incident include Geopolitical situations, 
ROE, the fog of war, as well as the lack of experience with the system and system failure.  All 
but one of these factors could be considered human factors.  This is why it is so important to 
explore human factors. 
        3. Ethical and Political Implications  
 
As stated previously, a discussion on SA drove critical changes to the direction of the 
project.  Political and ethical implications also weighed heavily on those decisions.  America is 
bound by the Geneva Convention as well as other international laws of war.  These laws demand 
that there is a limit to collateral damage.  It is paramount to determine combatants from non-
combatants in order to limit collateral damage.  Because of the difficulty of accountability, 
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 completely autonomous weapons are seen as problematic.  As a result, there is a political 
impetus to keep a HITL, meaning that a human controller must authorize weapons release 
(Lazarski 2001). 
The project team was also aware of the ethical implications of automated systems, as was 
Thomas Sheridan, a noted researcher in the field of supervisory behavior and automation. He has 
expressed concern that operators interfacing with technology could have the tendency to trust 
technology without question and abandon responsibility for their own actions.  Because of the 
design of computers and the associated interfaces with peripheral equipment, the tendency of the 
operator is to implicitly trust the output of the computer.   
This leads to a dilemma for program managers during development of weapons systems.  
How much automation is politically acceptable?  The tendency is to remove human failure by 
completely automating the system.  The most acceptable solution may be to automate the 
weapon system while maintaining a human override capability.  For this to work, the operating 
personnel would need to be well versed in the functionality of the system.  This option is 
understood as an alternative; however, it is not considered in the modeling approach in this 
study. 
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 III. TECHNICAL APPROACH 
The technical approach section of the report presents the project stakeholders and their 
applicable requirements, the capability gap the project aims to fill, the assumptions that went into 
the project and the associated computer based models, and the systems engineering processes 
followed over the course of the project.  First, the stakeholders will be defined, and their 
individual system functional requirements discussed.  Next, the capability gaps the system is 
aiming to fill are explored.  Then, the assumptions used to bound the system and translate the 
system functional requirements into a system capable of being modeled are laid out.  Finally, the 
systems engineering design process will be surveyed. 
A. STAKEHOLDERS 
        1. Definitions and Customers 
 
The literal definition of a stakeholder is, “Any party that has an interest (stake) in a 
project, firm or enterprise” (Calvano 2008).  However, adhering strictly to this definition when 
dealing with systems intended to be used in combat would produce a massive list of 
stakeholders.  When considering the different viewpoints concerning both strategy and tactics, 
not only amongst the services, but even between members of the same service, comprehensive 
requirements definition at any level would become impossible to accomplish in a reasonable 
amount of time.  Therefore, it is prudent to narrow the scope of stakeholders by only considering 
those that are most relevant.  The team has defined a relevant stakeholder as any organization or 
individual with a direct interest in actions or decisions concerning this project.  The interest may 
be because they will have a role in implementing the decisions, or because they will be directly 
affected by the decision (Calvano 2008).  Given this scope, the relevant stakeholders can be 
further stratified by identifying those who are implementing the decisions, those that are being 
affected by the decisions, or both.   
Those who both make the decisions and are directly affected by them are our most 
important stakeholders.  There are two categories of these, with each individual within in a 
category being equally important.  The first category of stakeholders is the Combatant 
Commanders (CCDRs) who are charged by the President with effectively planning and 
executing operations in their area of responsibility.  This includes defining the capabilities 
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 needed to execute operational plans.  If the system we are designing is intended to support these 
operations, it must meet CCDR requirements.  The second category is the Fleet Commanders 
whose Title 10 responsibilities are to man, train, and equip the naval forces for the CCDR.  
These persons are the vital link between fielded equipment, operators and the CCDR’s 
requirements to execute operations.  If a Fleet Commander cannot support our system as 
designed, it cannot be fielded. 
The second stratum of stakeholders includes those that are directly affected by the 
decisions.  Although these are all tactical operators charged with physically using the system, 
they can be broken down further according to the level of war fighting integration required at 
their level of command.  There are four categories with each individual within a category being 
equally important; Commander, Carrier Strike Group (CCSG), ship captains assigned air defense 
responsibilities, tactical system operators, and tactical system maintainers.  CCSGs exercise 
tactical control and coordination of multiple units in support of an assigned mission.  These 
commanders must integrate and utilize the fielded system as part of a larger force that may 
contain many dissimilar platforms.  Our system must be able to integrate with other units 
tactically.  Ships in an air defense posture must operate the physical system and do so in a 
manner that is consistent with the intentions of the CCSG.  They must set the operational 
parameters for the system within its operating limits.  Tactical system operators are the button 
pushers.  If the fielded system is to be operated effectively, the input of those that must 
physically operate it is essential.  Even the most elegant EW solution to the ASCM problem will 
be useless if it cannot be effectively operated in a high stress environment.  Tactical system 
maintainers work to keep the system up and running.  No matter how well designed, the fielded 
system will require maintenance.  The proposed design must include input from personnel 
performing these actions. 
The third stratum of stakeholders consists of those that have a role in implementing the 
decisions but are not directly affected by the outcome; the system producers and the producers of 
other ASCMD systems.  “Directly affected by the outcome” indicates that the fielded system will 
be an integral part of the day-to-day routine of the individual.  It does not mean that an individual 
will experience ancillary effects, such as a loss of position.  Ranked first by the monetary risk 
involved are the system producers.  If we cannot design a system that will be profitable to 
produce, there will be no fielded system.  The number of stakeholders and their ranking in this 
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 category will change dependent on the final system configuration.  Second are the producers of 
other (i.e., hard kill) ASMD systems.  If the fielded system is to be an integrated solution, it will 
require input from these producers. 
        2. Stakeholder Requirements 
 
Discussion with Commander Cerovsky and information warfare operators from Carrier 
Strike Group Twelve and amongst the team has produced the following requirements.  These 
requirements have been compiled, categorized, and placed into table 3 shown below.   
 
Category Requirement 
System must be responsive enough to counter Hypersonic missiles detected at close range. 
System must provide 360-degree engagement capability for each platform on which it is 
installed. 
System must have capability of engaging multiple threats at once. 
System must be able to route engagements to other defensive systems in the event of target 
saturation. 
System must be able to assume engagement from other defensive systems on command or as 
a result of doctrinal requirement. 
Performance 
System must be scalable to different size platforms. 
System must be integrated with other defensive weapons on the platform. 
System must not interfere with communications or navigation systems. 
System must be interoperable with other defensive systems operating in a joint or coalition 
environment. 
System must not interfere with flight operations at sea during normal operation (missile 
engagement excepted). 
System must utilize military standard communications protocols and paths. 
Interoperability 
System must be capable of being retrofitted to existing platforms. 
System must allow human intervention at time of the operational commander’s choosing, i.e. 
it cannot be designed to be completely autonomous. 
System must contain kill chain breaks (such as keys or firing pins) that may be removed or 
inserted at the discretion of the operational commander. 
Oversight 
System must capable of being shut down immediately. 
System must be operable by a typical watch stander (no excessive training requirements 
compared to currently fielded systems). 
System must be operable in port (special operating mode allowed). 
System must be maintainable by typical personnel at sea. 
System must have redundancy in the event of battle damage or power loss. 
System must conform to current display standards on Navy combatants. 
System must be upgradable. 
Operation and 
Maintenance 
System must be operable by typical naval combatant power systems. 
 
Table 3:  Stakeholder Requirements. 
The table displays system functionality requirements generated from the stakeholders. 
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 B. SHIP DEFENSIVE CAPABILITY GAPS 
 
When it comes to defense of naval combatants, the best option from an operational 
standpoint is early detection and elimination of the threat.  Shooting the archer, not the arrow, is 
a fundamental tenet of defensive warfare.  In naval missile warfare, that means early detection 
and discrimination to achieve engagement criteria.  In modern operating environments cluttered 
with non-combatants, both detection and discrimination are hard to achieve.  Picking out the 
archer from the crowd of white shipping, air traffic, and land-based clutter is a complex problem 
at best and is near impossible in the case of a terrorist threat.  
To mitigate this problem, one approach is to both expand and increase the resolution of 
the sensor horizon by the networking of all available sensors as is done with the Cooperative 
Engagement Capability (CEC).  In fact, network-centric operation as it is called, is well down the 
path to becoming the default doctrine by which the armed forces operate.  Unfortunately, it has 
done remarkably little to enable the early detection of an ASCM before the active seeking 
terminal phase. 
Even if technology progresses to the point that allows the complete integration of every 
sensor in a theater, the problem of recognizing the archer among the crowd persists, something 
that certainly requires a HITL to solve.  Additionally, the defense of one ship is completely 
reliant on both ubiquitous communications and other platforms in relatively close proximity.  
Neither of these scenarios is a current reflection of real world operating environments.  
Additionally, once launched, the simple truth is that the probability of radar detection of a sea-
skimming missile at range is unacceptably low.  
The most consistent unambiguous indication of a missile attack is the detection of a 
missile’s active radar seeker.  The signal is unique from other radar signals and is generally 
pointed directly at its target.  Current U.S. capabilities are relatively robust in this area.  
However, the use of passive Radio Frequency (RF) sensors for missile warnings creates a 
situation vulnerable to exploitation by missile designers as explained below. 
If one assumes that a naval combatant’s first indication of an inbound missile will be the 
detection of the missile seeker, the time from detection to impact is a straightforward function of 
missile speed and seeker turn on time.  The most serious threats utilize a combination of inertial 
or GPS guidance with an active seeker only for the terminal phase.   
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 Missile speed also affects the response time available to the defense.  Cappacio (2007) 
notes that: 
Charts prepared by the Navy for a February 2005 briefing for defense contractors said the 
Sizzler, which is also called the SS-N-27B, starts out flying at subsonic speeds.  Within 
10 nautical miles of its target, a rocket-propelled warhead separates and accelerates to 
three times the speed of sound, flying no more than 10 meters (33 feet) above sea level.  
 
A Mach 3.0 missile detected at 10 nm will result in a detect-to-engage timeline of less 
than one minute, and that assumes perfect sensor coverage.  Choosing this as the “design to” case 
raises the question of how best to defeat the inbound missile once it is detected.  Current tactics 
emphasize hard-kill options with countermeasures and current systems have the capability of 
both automatically deploying chaff/flares as decoys and shooting.  In this situation, shooting 
something that is misidentified or not shooting because of a very restrictive doctrine would have 
enormous military and political consequences.  
Most operational commanders chose to insert a human in the decision making loop, 
resulting in a situation where sensors only provide inputs to human operators and a human must 
choose how to deploy a response.  This required human involvement limits the timeline of 
responses to unacceptably long periods when presented with a sophisticated missile such as the 
SS-N-27B.  Cappacio (2007) states that:  
The Defense Department's weapons-testing office judges the threat so serious that its 
director, Charles McQueary, warned the Pentagon’s chief weapons-buyer in a memo that 
he would move to stall production of multibillion-dollar ship and missile programs until 
the issue was addressed. 
 
Lastly, the increased timeline resulting from human involvement is not even the most 
serious problem.  Cappacio (2007) also mentions that: 
The Navy’s ship-borne AEGIS system, deployed on cruisers and destroyers starting in 
the early 1980s, is designed to protect aircraft-carrier battle groups from missile attacks.  
But current and former officials say the Navy has no assurance AEGIS, built by 
Lockheed Martin Corp., is capable of detecting, tracking and intercepting the Sizzler.  
 
Because the AEGIS system was designed to be used in blue water battles, platforms with 
that system of defense could be susceptible to littoral terrorist attacks from “friendly” surface 
platforms using modified ASCM systems.  Even if the Navy’s most advanced hard-kill defensive 
system does get a warning early enough, it may not be able to do anything about it.  
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 C. GENERAL ASSUMPTIONS 
 
For assessment of the bounds and scoping of the project, the team made several specific 
assumptions in defining the baseline scenario:   
 
• The EW will not interfere with the Target Illuminators. 
• The Fire Control System (FCS) will operate as the server for the queuing system. 
• The system radar can track multiple targets. 
• Targets will be treated as discrete events and not a swarm.  Each event is discrete even if 
multiple events occur at the same time. The model is designated in the form A/B/S, 
where A is the arrival distribution, B is the Service Time Distribution, and s is the 
number of servers.  The model chosen for this study has a Markov distribution (M), a 
general service time distribution (G), and a single server (1).  Thus, the model is 
designated M/G/1. 
• Arrival rates are unknown. 
• Threats shall have the performance characteristics indicated in table 1.  Other parameters 
shall be estimated. 
• Surface combatants shall have nominal values for their parameters. 
• The ability to radiate Electro-Magnetic (EM) energy is unrestricted – no Emission 
Control (EMCON). 
• Weather conditions shall be average (rather than extreme), with sea state between zero 
and two.  There shall be good visibility, low humidity, low clutter, and no precipitation. 
• The battlespace shall be in blue water areas outside of shipping lanes. 
• When a HITL is present, only one person will act and that person will be in a supervisory 
position. 
D. SYSTEMS ENGINEERING DESIGN PROCESS 
 
The main objective of the systems engineering design process as applied to this problem 
is to investigate how the HITL affects the overall performance of the IEW, hard-kill, and soft-kill 
systems onboard a 21st century warship.  The investigation will provide information concerning 
the level of automation that is acceptable.  One extreme would be to allow the HITL to make all 
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 the decisions and have no automation. Without any automation the HITL would have to detect, 
classify, track and engage the target along with each respective sub-function as shown in Figure 
8.  Another extreme would be to have no HITL and have a completely automated process in 
which an onboard computer receives all the information and makes all the decisions.  Hence, a 
systems engineering design process is needed that allows and enables the simulation and 
evaluation of such a system and which provides insight into acceptable alternatives. 
The systems engineering design process includes: an initial research of literature, 
stakeholder analysis, requirements generation, an Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) approach, 
modeling and simulation, risk management and human factors integration.  This project is 
considered a science and technology effort; not a complete DoD acquisition project that would 
require a more comprehensive systems engineering design process as described on page 664 in 
Blanchard & Fabrycky’s book Systems Engineering and Analysis (2006).  Figure 7 shown below 
illustrates the full range of tasks that make up the systems engineering process.  Because of the 
limited time available for the project, the team was only able to perform selected tasks. 
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Figure 7:  Excerpt from Systems Engineering and Analysis, Fourth Edition. 
This excerpt was taken from page 664 of Blanchard and Fabrycky’s book  (2006).  This page displays a breakdown 
of the three parts of the Systems Engineering Management Plan.  Had the project not been a Science and 
Technology effort the team would have had to follow this plan more closely. 
 
The systems engineering design process began with the initial research of literature by 
which it was determined that the HITL was a main contributor in failures to neutralize the 
incoming ASCM threat as previously discussed.  The stakeholder analysis led to the 
development of requirements as in table 3, and the DTE system as illustrated in figure 8 in 
Chapter IV.  An selection process was conducted to determine which simulation emulator 
software would be used to develop the simulation models.  The results are provided in Appendix 
C.  Six different emulation software packages were considered: Excel, Rockwell’s Arena version 
10, SIMIO, Matlab, ExtendSim, and OPEmCSS.  The software selection was based on 10 
attributes (categories) each of which received a respective weight based on importance.   Each 
category then received a subjective score from 0-10 for each emulation software package.  Excel 
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 and Rockwell’s Arena received the highest scores of 951 and 805 respectively.   Rockwell’s 
Arena was chosen to be the primary emulation tool.  Excel was the secondary emulation tool, 
and it was also used to verify and validate the simulation results from Rockwell’s Arena.  
Arena’s Input Analyzer was used to determine how to set the parameters for the different 
simulation processes.  Arena’s Output Analyzer was used to set the model’s warm-up period 
parameters and to evaluate the simulation’s overall response behavior. 
The Base Case Model was developed as a basis to evaluate the IEW, hard-kill, and soft-
kill systems without a HITL.  The parameters of the Base Case Model are described in Chapter 
IV.  After evaluating the Base Case Model, it was modified by inserting a HITL process.  There 
was much discussion on where to insert the HITL, ultimately it was decided to insert the HITL 
before the IEW queue and hard-kill, soft-kill queue.  A third model, the Integrated Base 
Case/HITL Model, was developed to simulate a more comprehensive simulation of the HITL, 
IEW, hard-kill and soft-kill systems.  Through a series of model runs and sensitivity analysis the 
models provided much insight into how the HITL affected the response performance of the 
overall onboard ship defense systems. 
DoD risk management tools and techniques were used to evaluate and mitigate various 
risks throughout the system design process.  As risks were identified a risk category was 
assigned as well as the severity and likelihood of the respective risk.  Project risks were 
monitored and evaluated on a weekly basis and received risk status updates at the weekly project 
team meetings. 
The consideration, evaluation, and implementation of human factors was instrumental in 
the Engineering Design Process as it enabled the team to conduct the core analysis on the HITL 
effects on the overall onboard ship defense systems.  HITL average reaction times and minimum 
and maximum reaction times were assigned for the various levels of automation. and were 
simulated by the HITL models.  These times are shown in table 8 in Chapter IV.  
A good understanding of systems engineering principles is critical in the planning, 
design, implementation, sustainment, and retirement of any project.  Applying these principles 
early on and consistently throughout the duration of a project will ensure a more manageable 
project and higher likelihood of success. 
Incorporating the stakeholders early in the technical approach a more relevant solution 
can be obtained and user operational requirements met.  Ship defensive capability gaps have 
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 been identified and a notional solution provided to bridge these current gaps.  A list of general 
assumptions were then generated to bound and define the scope of the project which led to the 
generation of a baseline HITL model.  A systems engineering design process was used to create 
the HITL models and design an implementation of a variety of levels of automation as described 
in table 2.  After which, an analysis of the baseline HITL was conducted and appropriate 
recommendations made. 
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 IV. DESIGN AND ANALYSIS 
The design and analysis section of the report presents the project key capabilities, 
battlespace definition and scenarios, design parameters for each model, the conceptual design for 
each model and current and proposed solution analyses.  The project key capabilities are 
characterized by the functional breakdown of the DTE sequence.  The battlespace definitions and 
scenarios are characterized by the OV-1 system operational concept.  The design parameters 
provide detailed design constraints and functionality for each model that was developed.  The 
conceptual design is explained and shown for each model developed.  Finally each model is used 
to develop a detailed analysis for each proposed solution and is presented with and over view of 
the respective results.  Representative modeling and simulation results are shown in appendix D. 
 
A. KEY CAPABILITIES 
 
Based on an analysis of the requirements and threat timelines, the current need is for a 
system that is capable of detecting incoming threats at ranges greater than ten nautical miles, 
quickly analyzing incoming ASCM threats to characterize them, and determining an appropriate 
response.  The system must be capable of employing countermeasures automatically or with 
limited human oversight, and it must have electromagnetic compatibility with other ship systems. 
The following paragraphs describe how the functions of the IEW and the defensive 
system were modeled using the selected Arena software in order to gain insight into the effects 
of various levels of human involvement in the operation of the systems. 
Detection is defined as the process of discovering the presence of a target using the 
existing shipboard sensor suite.  This sensor suite includes infrared, electro-optical, radar, and 
human observers.  For the purposes of the system model; detection will be modeled by a pre-
determined arrival rate. 
Post-detection threat categorization (or classification) happens once the threat has been 
given a designation.  Parameters are recorded and evaluated against a pre-populated database of 
threat parameters.  If a system matches a particular threat system in the database, or displays 
properties characteristic of ASCMs such as altitude, velocity, and radar return, it will be 
designated a threat and an initial response will be determined.  For the purposes of the system 
model, the entities arriving into the system queue are assumed to already be properly classified 
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 as ASCM threats.  The entities will have randomly assigned parameters which govern whether 
the model selects the initial response to be a hard- or soft-kill regime. 
Employment of responses after threat classification consists, for example, of launching 
missiles such as the Standard Missile or firing the Phalanx Close-In Weapons System.  It might 
also consist of soft-kill measures such as the employment of a controlled high energy RF 
emission, or the employment of decoys such as flares or chaff.  Countermeasures employment is 
modeled by routing of the threat based on its randomized characteristics to either hard- or soft-
kill subsystems. 
Electromagnetic compatibility is a design feature or attribute rather than a functional 
capability; however, its inclusion is critical.  The system will be designed in such a way to limit 
production of signals that might interfere with other ship systems.  Accordingly, it will also be 
designed to reject incoming signals that might interfere with its own systems.  Through the use 
of subsystem design principles, topside design principles, and electromagnetic environmental 
effects evaluation, both at the subsystem and system level, the system will operate successfully 
in the highly RF cluttered shipboard environment.  This parameter is not included in the model 
of the system.  Within the DTE sequence shown in figure 8 the HITL-automated system 
interaction takes place at function block 4.4, “Command/Initiate Response.”  
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Figure 8:  DTE Sequence. 
This is a functional breakdown of the DTE sequence that the system is being modeled to.  The first step is to detect 
an incoming threat.  Step two will classify the threat and store the data.  Step three will track the target and save a 
current track field.  Step two and three operate concurrently and feed into step four.  Step four is where the system 
decides a course of action, evaluates whether it was a successful engagement, and either reengages the target or ends 
the sequence. 
B. BATTLESPACE DEFINITION 
        1. Definitions 
 
Although the battlespace for an EW engagement includes the EM spectrum, when 
countering an inbound missile time and distance are paramount.  The IEW model is primarily 
concerned with the time delays incurred before a response, either hard-kill or soft-kill, can be 
deployed.  The complexities of different EW techniques (both offensive and defensive) are not 
investigated in this study; hence the electromagnetic spectrum is not a variable in the model. 
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 As previously discussed, the early detection and elimination of the threat is highly 
desirable in ASCMD.  Aimed at achieving this, the expansion of the sensor horizon by the 
networking of different platforms increases the physical volume of space that must be 
considered.  However, a large physical volume of space containing many intelligent entities is 
difficult to model. 
In order to mitigate this, the simulated battlespace must be constrained to an area that can 
be analyzed accurately.  At the same time, “It must be large enough to include all of the locations 
that will be occupied by the players in the simulation (threats and EW protected platforms)” 
(Adamy 2006).  To accomplish this, we have chosen to limit the scope of the battlespace to the 
sensor horizon of a single combatant (one EW protected platform).  This approach highlights two 
important assumptions of the model.  First, the most dangerous scenario that the system must 
counter is the case where detection of an ASCM can occur only at seeker turn-on using only 
sensors on the defended platform.  Second, as a practical matter, EW is most effective when 
employed from the targeted platform itself. 
For the purposes of our simulation, the battlespace will be defined as a generalized three-
dimensional space surrounding a surface combatant.  The shape and limits of this volume of 
space will be dependent on the available sensors.  The areas at and below the surface of the water 
are excluded due to the obvious fact that ASCM’s do not fly on or under water. 
        2. Battlespace Scenarios 
 
Predicting the myriad of tactical scenarios that will be faced by a weapon system during 
operational use is complex.  The problem of multiple ASCM launch platforms, as portrayed in 
figure 9, and large numbers of entities contained in the modeling space allows the perturbations 
to become extraordinarily large.  The one constant in all scenarios, however, is an ASCM 
airborne and targeting a defended platform.  By bounding the model battlespace, the tactical 
scenarios have been reduced to the common problem of countering a missile once airborne.  
Because of this, the model is valid for every scenario resulting from an ASCM launched from 
any platform at any distance.  The primary objective is to study a quick reaction engagement and 
the limited decision timeline associated with it.  This particular scenario can be considered 
typical of every other scenario. 
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Figure 9:  OV-1 System Operational Concept. 
This picture captures the typical scenarios that the system is expected to encounter.  The system can face ASCM 
threats from air, land, and sea based platforms. 
        3. Design Parameters 
a.  Base Case Model 
The objective of the Base Case Model is to demonstrate the base case relationship 
between the IEW engagement response performance with no human in the loop given a specified 
Engagement Service Request (ESR) arrival schedule.  The expected result for the Base Case 
Model is a statistical output for the model for the parameters as listed in table 4 below. 
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Instantaneous Utilization IEW 1 and IEW 2
Number Busy IEW 1 and IEW 2
Number Scheduled IEW 1 and IEW 2
Scheduled Utilization IEW 1 and IEW 2
Total Number Seized IEW 1 and IEW 2









Table 4:  Base Case Parameters. 
These parameters make up the base case EW Arena Model. 
 
The model was evaluated using a warm-up period of 1,000 seconds to ensure steady state 
conditions had been reached.  The number of replications was set to 1,000 to ensure variability 
reaches a steady state as well.  Replication Length was arbitrarily set to 10 hours to generate 
results over time.  The base time units were set to seconds for analysis purposes. 
The model used a number of processes and associated parameters to produce the results.  
The different model processes are described in table 5 below.  The probabilistic distributions 
associated with the model parameters were estimated values representative of actual systems. 
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 Process Name Description
Receive (Engagement Service Request) ESR
Schedule, Discrete Probability Distribution with a 
probability of 1 for a specified set of entities per 
arrival
Sample Number of Tgts in ESR
The Sample Number of Tgts in ESR process tallies 
the number of ESR received for record keeping and 
statistical calculations.
Enter IEW Queue
Is a 2-way by Condition process with the following 
criteria: ((IEW CHARGE.WIP + IEW 
Engagement.WIP + IEW Transition.WIP)<8), 
which basically only allows for 8 ESR entities to be 
served in a dual server queue.  If the queue is 
greater than 8 the ESR will be balked and rerouted 
to an alternate hard-kill system for engagement.
IEW CHARGE
The IEW CHARGE process has a Seize delay 
action with the following criteria: (Expo(.3))*No. of 
tgts. This expression shows an exponential 
distribution to represent the Poisson memory-less 
process of charging the IEW as part of the 
engagement process.
IEW Engagement
The IEW Engagement process has a Standard 
Delay action with the following criteria: (NORM( 1, 
.3))*No. of tgts. This expression shows a normal 
distribution with the required engagement 
response time for the IEW to effectively neutralize 
an ASCM threat.
IEW Transition
The IEW Transition process has a Delay Release 
action with the following criteria: (WEIB(.5,.6))*No. 
of tgts. This expression shows a Weibel 
distribution with the required parameters for the 
IEW to transition to a ready state to service a new 
ESR.
Completed ESR
The Completed ESR process tallies the number of 
ESR completed by the IEW System Queue for 
record keeping and statistical calculations.
Count Rerouted ESR
The Count Rerouted ESR process tallies the 
number of ESR rerouted by the IEW System Queue 
for record keeping and statistical calculations.
Reroute to Alt Engagement Support
The Reroute to Alt Engagement Support 
process finalizes the process for rerouted 
ESRs.
IEW System Queue (2 IEW Radars)
 
 
Table 5:  Base Case Model Processes. 
The table lists the processes involved in the base case model and describes their properties and functionality. 
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 b.  HITL Models 
The objective of the HITL Model is to demonstrate the relationship between the IEW 
engagement response performance with a HITL given a specified ESR arrival schedule and 
HITL reaction time.  The expected result for the modified Base Case Model is a statistical output 
for the model for the parameters listed in table 6 below. 
 

















Instantaneous Utilization IEW 1 and IEW 2
Number Busy IEW 1 and IEW 2
Number Scheduled IEW 1 and IEW 2
Scheduled Utilization IEW 1 and IEW 2
Total Number Seized IEW 1 and IEW 2
Counter Count Rerouted ESR
HITL Average Delay
HITL ESR Total Time
HILT ESRs in System










Table 6:  HITL Model Parameters. 
This table lists the HITL ARENA simulation model parameter categories and their respective parameters. 
 
The model was evaluated using a warm-up period of 1,000 seconds to ensure steady state 
conditions had been reached.  The number of replications was set to 1,000 to ensure variability 
reaches a steady state as well.  Replication Length was arbitrarily set to 10 hours to generate 
results over time.  The base time units were set to seconds for analysis purposes. 
The model used a number of processes and associated parameters to produce the results.  
The different model processes are described in table 7 below.  The probabilistic distributions 
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 associated with the model parameters were again estimated to be representative of actual 




Receive (Engagement Service Request) ESR
Schedule, Discrete Probability Distribution with a probability 
of 1 for a specified set of entities per arrival
Sample Number of Tgts in ESR
The Sample Number of Tgts in ESR process tallies the 
number of ESR received for record keeping and statistical 
calculations.
Human In The Loop Delay X sec
The Human In The Loop Delay X sec has a Transfer action 
that with the following criteria: TRIA( min reaction time, 
mean reaction time, maximum reaction time). This expression 
shows a triangular distribution with a minimum, mean and 
maximum response time reprinting the different levels of 
Automation for HITL.
Enter IEW Queue
Is a 2-way by Condition process with the following criteria: 
((IEW CHARGE.WIP + IEW Engagement.WIP + IEW 
Transition.WIP)<8), which basically only allows for 8 ESR 
entities to be served in a dual server queue.  If the queue is 
greater than 8 the ESR will be balked and rerouted to an 
alternate hard-kill system for engagement.
IEW CHARGE
The IEW CHARGE process has a Seize delay action with the 
following criteria: (Expo(.3))*No. of tgts. This expression 
shows an exponential distribution to represent the Poisson 
memory-less process of charging the IEW as part of the 
engagement process.
IEW Engagement
The IEW Engagement process has a Standard Delay action 
with the following criteria: (NORM( 1, .3))*No. of tgts. This 
expression shows a normal distribution with the required 
engagement response time for the IEW to effectively 
neutralize an ASCM threat.
IEW Transition
The IEW Transition process has a Delay Release action with 
the following criteria: (WEIB(.5,.6))*No. of tgts. This 
expression shows a Weibel distribution with the required 
parameters for the IEW to transition to a ready state to 
service a new ESR.
Completed ESR
The Completed ESR process tallies the number of ESR 
completed by the IEW System Queue for record keeping and 
statistical calculations.
Count Rerouted ESR
The Count Rerouted ESR process tallies the number of ESR 
rerouted by the IEW System Queue for record keeping and 
statistical calculations.
Reroute to Alt Engagement Support
The Reroute to Alt Engagement Support process finalizes 
the process for rerouted ESRs.
IEW System Queue (2 IEW Radars)
 
 
Table 7:  HITL Model processes. 
This table lists the HITL processes and gives a description of their respective functionality. 
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 The HITL reaction times were estimated for each level of human involvement.  The estimated 
delay times and their distributions are shown in table 8 below. 
 










The computer offers no assistance; 








Narrows the selection down to a 
few
2 10 16
4 Suggests one alternative 2 8 14
5




Allows the human a restricted time 
to veto before automatic execution
2 4 10
7
Executes automatically, then 
necessarily informs the human
0 0 0
8 Informs the human only if asked 0 0 0
9




The computer decides everything, 





Table 8:  HITL Reaction Times. 
This table shows the estimated values for mean, minimum, and maximum reaction times that a HITL will have 
depending on the level of human involvement.  These values were used in the team’s modeling and simulations.  
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 c.  Integrated Base Case/HITL Model  
The objective of the Integrated Base Case/HITL Model is to demonstrate the 
interrelationships of the onboard sensors, hard-kill systems, soft-kill systems, the IEW system 
and HITL interaction, and the respective performance responses, given a randomly specified 
Firing Service Request (FSR) over time.  The expected result for the Base Case Model is an 
output from the model for the parameters listed in table 9 below.  The model also provides 
statistical measures for the parameters.  The actual model results can be seen in Appendix D. 
 
Parameter Category Parameter Name Sub-Parameters








HITL  Delay Time




















Base FSR in System
Base FSR Wait Time





Total Time per Entity
Accumulated Time
Process Number In/Out
Usage (Instantaneous, Number Busy, Number Scheduled, 
Scheduled Utilization, Total Number Seized)Resource
 
 
Table 9:  Integrated Base Case / HITL Model Parameters. 
This table lists the category, name, and sub parameters of the integrated base case and HITL ARENA simulation 
model. 
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The model was exercised using a warm-up period of 200 seconds to ensure steady state 
conditions had been reached.  The number of replications was set to 1,000 to ensure variability 
reaches a steady state as well.  Replication Length was arbitrarily set to 8 hours to generate 
results over time.  The base time units were set to seconds for analysis purposes. 
The model used a number of processes and associated parameters to produce the results.  
The different model processes are described in tables 10 and 11 below.  The probabilistic 
distributions associated with the model parameters were estimates considered to be 




Receive FSR is a random process with the following parameters: Random(Expo), with a value of 7 
and the Entities per Arrival set to DISCRETE(0.2,0,0.4,1,0.6,2,0.8,3,1,4).  The Received FSR simulates 
the service loading for the system to engage an ASCM threat.
Detect Target Characteristics is assumed to be an instantaneous process with no time delay.  The 
assumption can be made that the target characteristics have been assessed through on-board ship 
sensors and that this information is received along with the FSR. The following attributes are 
associated with this process: 
Range: UNIFORM(0.5,25), range is in nautical-miles
Velocity: NORMAL(450,25), velocity is in nautical-miles per hour.
Hardkill or Softkill?
Is a 2-way by Condition process decides whether a threat enters the Hardkill or Softkill Queue and is 
set to the following parameters: (Range>10)&&(Velocity<500)&&(NC(Count HK Hit)+ NC(Count HK 
Miss) < 50). Where Range is in nautical-miles, Velocity is in nautical-miles per hour, the number of 
threats to be engaged by the onboard hardkill system is less than 50.
The HITL Delay process has a Standard Delay type action with the following criteria: TRIA( min 
reaction time, mean reaction time, maximum reaction time). This expression shows a triangular 
distribution with a minimum, mean and maximum response time reprinting the different levels of 
Automation for HITL.  The following parameters have been arbitrarily set for the different levels of 
Automation for HITL.
TRIA(2,4,8)—for 4 second HITL delay
TRIA(3,6,12)—for 6 second HITL delay
TRIA(4,8,16)—for 8 second HITL delay
TRIA(5,10,20)—for 10 second HITL delay
TRIA(7.5,15,30)—for 15 second HITL delay





Table 10:  Integrated Base Case/ HITL Model Processes and Parameters Part 1. 
This table shows the first half of the processes of the Base Case and HITL model.  It lists the process name, the 
parameters, and a description of what each process does. 
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 Process Name Description
HK Engage
The HK Engage process has a Standard Delay type action with the following criteria: 
Expo(MeanHKEngageTime).  This expression shows a random process with and exponential 
distribution based on the mean Hardkill engage time.
HK Assess
The HK Assess process has a Standard Delay type action with the following criteria: 
UNIF(MinAssessTime,MaxAssessTime ). This expression shows a uniform distribution with the 
minimum and maximum time as the defining parameters. The HK Assess process determines what 
HK system is best suited to engage the ASCM threat target.
Target Hit?
Is a 2-way by Condition process decides whether a threat was defeated by the HK system with the 
following criteria: UNIF(0,1)<HK_P_hit.  This expression shows a uniform distribution with the HK 
P_hit probability defining parameter.
Count HK Hit
The Count HK Hit process tallies the number of direct hit hardkill engagements used for record 
keeping and statistical calculations.
FSR Tgt Hit FSR Tgt Hit process finalizes the target hit process and calculates the respective entity statistic.
Count HK Miss
The Count HK Miss process tallies the number of missed hardkill engagements used for record 
keeping and statistical calculations.
FSR Tgt Miss FSR Tgt Miss process finalizes the target miss process and calculates the respective entity statistic.
Count EW FSR The Count EW EFR tallies the number of FSRs that enter the EW queue
EW Available?
Is a 2-way by Condition process that decides whether the EW system is available to engage an 
ASCM threat and has the following criteria: (EW Engage.WIP<EWEngageLimit). This expression 
shows that the EW system will be ready if the EW Engagement is less than the EW Engage limit.  
The EW engage limit is arbitrarily set.
EW Engage
The EW Engage process has a Standard time delay action with the following criteria: 
EXPO(MeanEWEngageTime). This expression shows the random process based on an exponential 
distribution with the mean EW engagement time as the defining parameter.
Count EW Engagement
The Count EW Engagement process tallies the number of EW engagements used for record keeping 
and statistical calculations.
EW FSR Engage
EW FSR Engage process finalizes the EW Engage process and calculates the respective entity 
statistic
Count EW Balk
The Count EW Balk process tallies the number of EW engagements that have balked for record 
keeping and statistical calculations.
EW FSR balked EW FSR balked process finalizes the EW balk process and calculates the respective entity statistic
 
 
Table 11:  Integrated Base Case/ HITL Model Processes and Parameters Part 2. 
This table shows the second half of the processes of the Base Case and HITL model.  It lists the process name, the 
parameters, and a description of what each process does. 
 
C. CONCEPTUAL DESIGN 
        1. Base Case Model 
 
For the Base Case IEW model the main objective was to demonstrate the base case 
relationship between the IEW engagement response performance with no HITL given a specified 
ESR arrival schedule.  The model is a high level representation of the ship’s IEW, hard-kill and 
soft-kill systems without a HITL.  
The model receives an ESR based on a predetermined schedule and then assesses the 
number of targets in the ESR.  It then determines which targets in the ESR can enter the IEW 
Queue based on predefined criteria.  If it can enter the IEW Queue the IEW system charges up, 
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engages the target and finally transitions to a ready state.  It is assumed that once the IEW system 
engages the target that it has a 100 percent probability of kill.  If a target in the ESR cannot enter 
the IEW Queue it balks to an Alternate Engagement Support process which consists of hard-kill 
and soft-kill systems.  It is assumed that the Alternate Engagement Support process occurs 
instantaneously and that it has a 100 percent engagement regardless of effectiveness.  Kill 
probability is not assumed for the Alternate Engagement Support.  It is solely assumed that the 
Alternate Engagement Support path will successfully process each ESR/FSR (i.e. there are no 
balks from that portion of the queue).  The model calculates various statistics as discussed in the 




Figure 10:  Base Case Model. 
This ARENA simulation model demonstrates the he IEW engagement response performance base case relationship between t
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         2. HITL Models 
 
The objective for the Base Case IEW model with a HITL is to demonstrate the base case 
relationship of the IEW engagement response performance given a specified ESR arrival 
schedule.  The model is a high level representation of the ship’s IEW, hard-kill and soft-kill 
systems with a HITL.  
The model receives an ESR based on a predetermined schedule and then assesses the 
number of targets in the ESR.  The model contains a HITL process which determines which 
targets in the ESR will be engaged by the IEW, hard-kill and soft-kill system. Introducing the 
HITL process causes a delay based on a predetermined level of automation.  The model then 
determines which targets in the ESR can enter the IEW Queue based on predefined criteria.  If it 
can enter the IEW Queue the IEW system charges up, engages the target and finally transitions 
to a ready state.  It is assumed that once the IEW system engages the target it has a 100 percent 
probability of kill.  If a target in the ESR cannot enter the IEW Queue it balks to an Alternate 
Engagement Support process which consists of hard-kill and soft-kill systems. It is assumed that 
the Alternate Engagement Support process occurs instantaneously and that it has a 100 percent 
engagement regardless of effectiveness.  Kill probability is not assumed for the Alternate 
Engagement Support.  It is solely assumed that the Alternate Engagement Support path will 
successfully process each ESR/FSR (i.e. there are no balks from that portion of the queue).  The 
model calculates various statistics as discussed in the design parameters section of this chapter. 
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Figure 11:  Base Case HITL Model. 
This ARENA simulation model demonstrates the  engagement response performance with a HITL.  base case relationship between the IEW
The model is a high level representation of the ship's IEW, hard-kill and soft-kill systems with a HITL. 
       48
 For the Integrated Base Case/HITL Model the main objective is to demonstrate the 
interrelationships of the onboard Sensors, hard-kill systems, soft-kill systems, the IEW system 
and HITL interaction and the respective performance responses given a randomly specified FSR 
over time.  The model is a high level representation of the ship’s IEW, hard-kill and soft-kill 
systems with a HITL.  The model is the first incremental redesign of the Base Case IEW with the 
HITL process and integrates more functionality such as the Target Hit assessment process. 
The model receives a FSR based on a predetermined random process and then 
characterizes targets in the FSR.  The model then determines whether a target in the FSR will be 
engaged by a hard-kill system or soft-kill system based on predefined criteria.  If it is determined 
that a target in the FSR will be engaged by the hard-kill system it then enters the HITL process 
which introduces a time delay based on a predefined level of automation.  The target in the FSR 
is then engaged by a hard-kill system, the model then assesses if the target was hit or not.  If it is 
determined that a target in the FSR will be engaged by a soft-kill system it enters the IEW 
Queue.  If the IEW system is available the target in the FSR is engaged by the IEW system.  If 
the IEW system is not available the target in the FSR balks out of the overall system. 
 




Figure 12:  Integrated Base Case/HITL Model. 
This ARENA simulation model’s main objective is to demonstrate the interrelationships of the onboard sensors, hard-kill systems, soft-kill systems, the 
IEW system and HITL interaction and the respective performance responses. The model is a high level representation of the ship’s IEW, hard-kill and soft-
kill systems with a HITL.  This is the first incremental redesign of the Base Case IEW with the HITL process and integrates more functionality such as the 
Target Hit assessment process. 
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D. CURRENT AND PROPOSED SOLUTION ANALYSIS 
 
        1.  Analysis of Models Outputs 
 
The model outputs are the response times to process an ESR or FSR.  The model’s 
outputs were used to analyze individual process performance and overall response performance 
to provide insight on the effects of modification in employment or hardware or software 
upgrades.  By comparing model times to the times available to intercept threats, it was also 




Miles Mach Speed 
Speed 
mi/hr Speed nm/hr 
Arrival time 
sec Notes: 
10 8.7 0.8 609 529 59 
Most Likely 
Engagement 
10 8.7 1.5 1142 992 32 
Likely 
Engagement 




Table 12:  System Response Performance. 
This table captures the response time that the system needs to accomplish given specific ASCM variables. 
 
Given the types of ASCM threats shown in table 1, Potential Anti-ship Cruise Missile 
threats, it is evident that most ASCM threats are subsonic and thus the most likely to be 
encountered.  However, with the advent of ASCMs capable of Mach 3+ speeds, it is necessary to 
be able to defend against such a threat as a worst-case scenario.  Based on timeline analyses, the 
objective response time to neutralize an ASCM threat has been set to 12 seconds upon detection 
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1000 1000 sec 10 hr 2 Base Case Light Attack        5.40        3.76      4.45  < 0.02       0.04       87.83  
1000 1000 sec 10 hr 4 Base Case Moderate Attack        5.40        3.76      4.45  < 0.02       0.04       87.83  
1000 1000 sec 10 hr 7 Base Case Heavy Attack      11.49        9.39     10.31  < 0.02          -        134.15  
1000 1000 sec 10 hr 2 4 sec HITL Delay Light Attack      10.77        8.81      9.71  < 0.02       2.65       84.95  
1000 1000 sec 10 hr 4 4 sec HITL Delay Moderate Attack      10.77        8.81      9.71  < 0.02       2.65       84.95  
1000 1000 sec 10 hr 7 4 sec HITL Delay Heavy Attack      12.02      10.30     11.07  < 0.02       2.53       88.62  
1000 1000 sec 10 hr 2 6 sec HITL Delay Light Attack      12.17      10.06     11.03  < 0.02       2.72       86.06  
1000 1000 sec 10 hr 4 6 sec HITL Delay Moderate Attack      12.17      10.06     11.03  < 0.02       2.72       86.06  
1000 1000 sec 10 hr 7 6 sec HITL Delay Heavy Attack      16.34      14.08     15.05  < 0.02       2.66      144.04  
1000 1000 sec 10 hr 2 8 sec HITL Delay Light Attack      13.53      11.32     12.36  < 0.02       2.87       88.23  
1000 1000 sec 10 hr 4 8 sec HITL Delay Moderate Attack      13.53      11.32     12.36  < 0.02       2.87       88.23  
1000 1000 sec 10 hr 7 8 sec HITL Delay Heavy Attack      14.29      12.50     13.37  < 0.02       2.79      111.72  
1000 1000 sec 10 hr 2 10 sec HITL Delay Light Attack      14.96      12.50     13.68  < 0.02       2.94       89.89  
1000 1000 sec 10 hr 4 10 sec HITL Delay Moderate Attack      14.96      12.50     13.68  < 0.02       2.94       89.89  
1000 1000 sec 10 hr 7 10 sec HITL Delay Heavy Attack      18.15      15.89     16.97  < 0.02       2.43      146.05  
1000 1000 sec 10 hr 2 15 sec HITL Delay Light Attack      18.14      15.36     17.00  < 0.02       3.10       94.14  
1000 1000 sec 10 hr 4 15 sec HITL Delay Moderate Attack      18.14      15.36     17.00  < 0.02       3.10       94.14  
1000 1000 sec 10 hr 7 15 sec HITL Delay Heavy Attack      18.83      16.44     17.63  < 0.02       2.88      116.10  
1000 1000 sec 10 hr 2 30 sec HITL Delay Light Attack      28.83      24.69     26.98  < 0.04       3.38      107.22  
1000 1000 sec 10 hr 4 30 sec HITL Delay Moderate Attack      28.83      24.69     26.98  < 0.04       3.38      107.22  
1000 1000 sec 10 hr 7 30 sec HITL Delay Heavy Attack      29.82      26.86     28.32  < 0.03       3.10      129.88  
 
Table 13:  Base Case HITL Model Analysis. 
This table captures the ESR Total time in seconds of each variation of HITL delays. 
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To conduct the sensitivity and performance analysis, 21 iterations of the Base Case-HITL 
model were run.  Each iteration consisted of 1,000 replications.  The entities per arrival were 
varied, simulating a light attack (2 entities per arrival), a moderate attack (4 entities per arrival) 
or a heavy attack (7 entities per arrival).  The model produced no change in performance 
between the light attack and moderate attack scenarios.  It can also be noted that the heavy attack 
scenarios had the greatest response time.  This was due to a higher entity wait time in the IEW 
Service Queue.  The model output ESR Total Time to engage an ASCM threat is shown in table 
13.  The highlighted light-blue cells indicate output values that are greater than the objective 
response time, but less than the threshold response time of 14 seconds.  The tan highlighted cells 
indicate scenarios in which system performance as determined by the model was insufficient to 
defend against the incoming threat – the response time was too great.  It is evident that the 
greater the HITL delay, the greater the response time.  Based on the initial findings it is 
recommended that under light or moderate attack scenarios human involvement be such as to 
limit HITL delay to 8 seconds or less..  This implies that the system must be designed to present 
only one alternative to the HITL for a decision (see table 8).  Further, in heavy attack scenarios it 
is recommended that a 4 second HITL delay be implemented which implies that the system will 
only allow the HITL a restricted time of about 4 seconds to veto continued operation before 
automatic threat prosecution takes place. 
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Base Case Light Attack        5.40        3.76      4.45  < 0.02       0.04       87.83  0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Base Case Moderate Attack        5.40        3.76      4.45  < 0.02       0.04       87.83  0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Base Case Heavy Attack      11.49        9.39     10.31  < 0.02          -        134.15  1.83% 0.00% 0.00% 6.56% 
4 sec HITL Delay Light Attack      10.77        8.81      9.71  < 0.02       2.65       84.95  0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
4 sec HITL Delay Moderate Attack      10.77        8.81      9.71  < 0.02       2.65       84.95  0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
4 sec HITL Delay Heavy Attack      12.02      10.30     11.07  < 0.02       2.53       88.62  0.01% 0.00% 0.00% 1.15% 
6 sec HITL Delay Light Attack      12.17      10.06     11.03  < 0.02       2.72       86.06  0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
6 sec HITL Delay Moderate Attack      12.17      10.06     11.03  < 0.02       2.72       86.06  0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
6 sec HITL Delay Heavy Attack      16.34      14.08     15.05  < 0.02       2.66      144.04  1.02% 0.00% 0.00% 4.19% 
8 sec HITL Delay Light Attack      13.53      11.32     12.36  < 0.02       2.87       88.23  0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
8 sec HITL Delay Moderate Attack      13.53      11.32     12.36  < 0.02       2.87       88.23  0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
8 sec HITL Delay Heavy Attack      14.29      12.50     13.37  < 0.02       2.79      111.72  0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.87% 
10 sec HITL Delay Light Attack      14.96      12.50     13.68  < 0.02       2.94       89.89  0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
10 sec HITL Delay Moderate Attack      14.96      12.50     13.68  < 0.02        2.94       89.89  0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
10 sec HITL Delay Heavy Attack      18.15      15.89     16.97  < 0.02       2.43      146.05  0.78% 0.00% 0.00% 3.30% 
15 sec HITL Delay Light Attack      18.14      15.36     17.00  < 0.02       3.10       94.14  0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
15 sec HITL Delay Moderate Attack      18.14      15.36     17.00  < 0.02       3.10       94.14  0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
15 sec HITL Delay Heavy Attack      18.83      16.44     17.63  < 0.02       2.88      116.10  0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.56% 
30 sec HITL Delay Light Attack      28.83      24.69     26.98  < 0.04       3.38      107.22  0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
30 sec HITL Delay Moderate Attack      28.83      24.69     26.98  < 0.04       3.38      107.22  0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
30 sec HITL Delay Heavy Attack      29.82      26.86     28.32  < 0.03       3.10      129.88  0.16% 0.00% 0.00% 1.95% 
 
Table 14:  Percent Balk. 
This table captures the percentage of balks based upon various HITL delays. 
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 In table 14 the light-green highlighted cells indicate a Percent Balk out of ESRs greater 
than 0%.  Balking is defined as the failure of an ESR or FSR to be engaged by either EW or 
hard-kill.  This is typically a result of exceeding maximum queue length.  The higher number of 
entities per ESR is directly related to a higher percentage of ESRs balking out of the IEW 
Service Queue.   This indicates that under a heavy attack scenario, the IEW system as modeled 
herein will not be able to successfully respond to all incoming ESRs regardless of the level of 
HITL; thus, if a “perfect” system is required, alternate hard- and soft-kill systems will need to be 
employed. 
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Figure 13:  Base Case and HITL response time summaries. 
This figure shows the various response times summarized based upon different HITL response times and severity of the attack numbers. 
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 In figure 13 the objective response time of 12 seconds is indicated by the red line and the 
threshold response time of 14 seconds is indicated by the blue line.  There appears to be an 
outlier in the results as indicated by the red circle.  The “6 sec HITL Delay Heavy Attack” 
iteration had a higher average response time than the other scenarios.  It also had the highest 
maximum response time value of 144.04 seconds.  This is primarily due to the IEW charge and 
transition times being abnormally high (60.83 seconds and 130.14 seconds, respectively). 
 






















Average FSR Number Out 136 137 137 137 136 136 136 
Average HITL Delay (s) 0.00 4.66 6.98 9.32 11.64 17.47 34.91 
Average FSR Total Time (s) 46.37 47.83 48.68 49.58 50.68 52.88 59.63 
Average HK Number  Hit 35.64 35.68 35.67 35.63 35.67 35.68 35.68 
Average HK Number Miss 15.10 15.07 15.11 15.13 15.10 15.12 15.17 
Average EW Number Hit 64.21 65.00 64.98 65.06 64.60 64.62 64.57 
Average EW Number 
Balked 20.82 21.00 21.18 21.11 21.01 20.91 20.87 
Percent Engaged by the HK 37% 37% 37% 37% 37% 37% 37% 
Percent Engaged by the EW 63% 63% 63% 63% 63% 63% 63% 
Percent Successful HK 70% 70% 70% 70% 70% 70% 70% 
Percent Successful EW 76% 76% 75% 76% 75% 76% 76% 
 
Table 15:  Integrated Base Case/HITL Model Analysis. 
This is an analysis of the outputs generated by the model. 
 
Five main outputs were selected for analysis of the overall performance of the Integrated 
Base Case/HITL Model as shown in tables 14 through 20.  The outputs are discussed in more 
detail in the section below.  
 










































Figure 14:  Average FSR Number Out. 













































Figure 15:  Average HITL Delay times in seconds. 
This figure shows the average delay times produced by the various HITL scenarios. 
 












































Figure 16:  Average FSR Time Totals in seconds. 









































Figure 17:  Average hard kill numbers hit. 
This figure shows the average number of hard kill targets that were hit based on the HITL delay times. 








































Figure 18:  Average hard kill numbers missed. 









































Figure 19:  Average EW numbers hit. 
This figure shows the average number of EW targets that were missed based on the HITL delay times. 
 







































Figure 20:  Average EW numbers balked. 
This figure shows the average number of EW targets that were missed based on the HITL delay times. 
 
The Average FSR Number Out, shown in figure 14, shows that the system received 
between 136 and 137 FSR in a given 8 hour simulation period regardless of what HITL delay 
was involved.  The Average HITL Delay, shown in figure 15, shows the increasing HITL delay 
trend which is correlated with the Average FSR Total Time, figure 16, and the Average HK 
Number Miss, figure 18.  The greater the HITL delay observed, the longer it takes for an FSR to 
be processed by the system.  Because the HITL delay directly affects the performance of the 
hard-kill engagements, a greater Average of HK Number Miss was observed as the HITL delay 
increased.  This was due to a slower response time to engage the ASCM threat.  On average, 37 
percent of the FSRs received were engaged by a hard-kill system with an average probability of 
hit (P-hit) of 0.70, or 70 percent.  Similarly an average of 63 percent of the FSRs received were 
engaged by the IEW with an average P-hit of 0.76 or 76 percent.  In the modeled defensive 
system, the soft-kill EW systems have a better performance than the hard-kill systems because 
the IEW systems serve more FSRs and have a greater P-hit than the hard-kill systems. 
The comparison of Integrated Base Case/HITL Model engagement times to the Base 
Case-HITL Model—IEW only engagement times bring to light the challenges associated with 
hard-kill systems defending against supersonic threats.   The Integrated Base Case/HITL Model 
had average FSR process times between 46.37 seconds and 59.63 seconds, which are very much 
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 greater than even the threshold engagement time of 14 seconds, to say nothing of the objective 
engagement time of 12 seconds.  This indicates an “EW engagement first” approach may be 
warranted in the Integrated model, in which hard-kill defined as the secondary option in order to 
assure some form of engagement within the threshold time.  
For the Integrated Base Case/HITL Model, functionality should be included for scenarios 
wherein a re-engagement is necessary due to an initial hard-kill miss.  The HITL delay could 
also be placed in different or multiple locations in the model, depending on the number and type 
of decisions left open to the HITL (for example, if a HITL is making the final determination as to 
the type of response being employed vs. if a particular sensor return is or is not a threat). 
The implementation of automation for a tactical system can be either Semi-Automatic 
(see figure 21), or Automatic (see figure 22). In the case of the Semi-Automatic system, the 
HITL needs to assess much of the sensor data and provide sensors feedback on their future 
operation.  In the case of the Automatic system, the sensor management is handled by the 
machine and not the HTIL allowing for more efficient situation assessment.  Machine generated 
options are presented to the HITL which can then be controlled by a veto or negation of the 
automatic machine generated decision. The higher the demand for sensor management the more 
an Automatic system is required because the HITL will be overwhelmed with the amount of 
sensor data received. The Automatic system is more costly to develop and maintain but will be 
needed in systems where the intended battlespace scenarios warrant a higher demand of sensor 




Figure 21:  Semi-Automatic Sensor System. 
This figure is a partial excerpt of figure 9 from Naval Network-Centric Sensor Resource Management (Green, 
Johnson, 2002, 13).  This figure shows a semi-automatic implementation for a sensor system with a HITL.      
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Figure 22:  Automatic Sensor System. 
This figure is the second part of figure 9 from Naval Network-Centric Sensor Resource Management (Green, 
Johnson, 2002, 13).  This figure shows an automatic implementation for sensor systems with a HITL. 
 
With additional time and effort the model developed in this project could include 
functionality allowing hard-kill systems to be used for re-engagement in addition to EW, based 
on availability of the EW system and the hard-kill systems.  Finally, functionality could be added 
to the model to incorporate the presence and characteristics of other defensive soft-kill systems 
like onboard countermeasures. 
Finally, the expansion of the model to include flexible HITL positions in the decision 
chain, re-engagement, and more specific parameters for hard-kill and soft-kill systems could be 
undertaken.  Doctrinal requirements, specific defensive system parameters, and threat system 
parameters based on actual system data could also be included.    
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 V. CONCLUSION 
        1. Findings 
This study has demonstrated that an increasing level of threat from Anti-Ship Cruise 
Missiles (ASCMs) calls for improvement to current ASCM defensive techniques.  In the past 50 
years of warfare, there have been many incidents of ASCMs being employed in a number of 
combat scenarios.  In each case examined herein there was a failure of existing tactics, 
techniques, or procedures that resulted in significant damage to the ship under attack and 
significant injury and loss of life to the ship’s crew.  There have been demonstrated failures in 
threat detection, threat discrimination and employment of defensive measures. 
This project’s objective was to improve the effectiveness of shipboard defensive systems 
through better integration of EW with hard kill systems.  The research performed by the team 
indicated that a major factor influencing effectiveness was the degree of human involvement in 
decision-making and operation of the systems.  Following requirements and functional analyses, 
the team’s systems engineering approach was to develop a baseline model simulating an 
integrated Electronic Warfare architecture. Using the model, the team examined options with 
levels of Human-In-the-Loop (HITL) involvement ranging from total automation to fully manual 
operation. 
The system was modeled both at the system level and the system of systems (SoS) level.  
At the system level, external factors were assumed in order to concentrate on the effect of the 
HITL.  It was shown that a minimal HITL influence was preferred as this lowered the potential 
delay in deploying a hard- or soft-kill response to an incoming threat to an acceptable level.  
When considered at the SoS level, the simulation allowed for factors such as a limited number of 
hard-kill assets, and performance of the incoming threat.  Here again it was shown that a lower 
HITL influence was better for the success of the overall engagement from the perspective of the 
defending platform. 
The models developed in this project used assumed and estimated but realistic values for 
the effects of HITL delays.  The results indicated that under light or moderate attack scenarios 
human involvement in defensive system operation should be such as to limit HITL delay to 8 
seconds or less.  This implies that, for this scenario, the system must be designed to present only 
one alternative to the HITL for a decision, not multiple alternatives.  Further, in heavy attack 
scenarios it was found that a maximum 4-second HITL delay could be tolerated.  This implies 
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 that under this condition, the system should be designed to limit the HITL role to deciding 
whether to veto continued operation before automatic threat prosecution takes place. 
The system-related findings of this study aim to eliminate the gaps in performance 
demonstrated in the historical examples discussed above.  The proposed system features provide 
for integration of ship sensor systems with both the Command and Control (C2) personnel and 
the hard- and soft-kill defensive systems in existing and future USN ship designs.  While the 
proposed features can be implemented with existing systems, it has been demonstrated that the 
existing systems might not provide for optimal defensive performance.  Instead, new or 
improved systems, which reduce or eliminate the need for human operators and decision makers 
are preferred. 
        2. Recommendations 
The ASCM threat will likely only increase over time.  The proliferation of ASCMs and 
the advancement of technologies employed within them will only serve to make both blue water 
and littoral engagements more dangerous for future surface combatants. For success in future 
engagements, it is imperative that the U.S. and her allies implement an effective system to enable 
defense against this evolving threat. 
It is recommended that the modeling and simulation effort begun under this study be 
continued both in more detail using more refined estimates and assumptions.  Additional details 
to be added to the model might include additional threat parameters such as typical fly-out paths, 
terminal engagement types, seeker parameters, launch platform behavior, and own-ship sensor 
performance.  Future efforts could include usage of actual threat parameters, such as information 
on particular known threat ASCMs, and higher fidelity human performance information. 
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 Appendix B - Acronyms 
AGM Air-to-Ground Missile 
AoA Analysis of Alternatives 
ASCM Anti-Ship Cruise Missile 
ASCMD Anti-Ship Cruise Missile Defense 
AWS AEGIS Weapon System 
C2 Command and Control 
CHETA China Haiying Electromechanical Technology Academy 
CIC Combat Information Center 
CCDR Combatant Commander 
CCSG Commander, Carrier Strike Group 
CEC Cooperative Engagement Capability 
CIWS Close-In Weapons System 
COTS Commercial Off The Shelf 
CNO Chief of Naval Operations 
CSG Carrier Strike Group 
DTE Detect To Engage 
DoD Department of Defense 
DRDO Defense Research and Development Organization 
EMCON Emission Control 
EM Electro-Magnetic 
EO Electro-Optical 
ESM Electronic Support Measure 
EW Electronic Warfare 
EWS Electronic Warfare System 
ESR Engagement Service Request 
FCS Fire Control System 
FSR Firing Service Request 
FFG Guided Missile Frigate 
GPS Global Positioning System 
HEAT High Explosive Anti-Tank 
HITL Human-In-The-Loop 
HMS His/Her Majesty's Ship 
HSI Human Systems Integration 
IEWS Integrated Electronic Warfare System 
IFF Identification, Friend or Foe 
INCOSE International Council on System Engineering 
INS Inertial Navigation System 
INS Israeli Naval Ship 
IR Infrared 
JETT Joint Electronic Warfare Task Team 
LOS Line of Sight 
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 MOD Ministry of Defence 
MOSA Modular Open System Architecture 
M&S Modeling and Simulation 
MSSE Master of Science in Systems Engineering 
MV Merchant Vessel 
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
NDI Non-Developmental Item 
NPS Naval Postgraduate School 
NM Nautical Mile 
OA Open Architecture 
PATRIOT Phased Array Tracking Radar to Intercept Of Target 
RF Radio Frequency 
RGM Radar Guided Missile 
RN Royal Navy 
ROE Rules of Engagement 
SA Situational Awareness 
SoS System of Systems 
SAG Surface Action Group 
SSDS Ship Self-Defense System 
UAE United Arab Emirates 
UAV Unmanned Aerial Vehicle 
UGM Underwater Guided Missile 
UHF Ultra High-Frequency 
UK United Kingdom 
US United States 
USS United States Ship 
USAF United States Air Force 
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 Appendix C - Emulator Software Selection  
Modeling and Simulation Software Scored     
  Software 
Category (Sorted by 
Alphabetical Order) Excel Arena SIMIO MATLAB ExtendSim OPEmCSS 
Availability 10 10 5 5 5 5 
Capability 8 8 5 5 5 5 
Cost 10 10 5 5 5 5 
Experience with SW 10 8 5 5 5 5 
Fidelity (Validated 
Models) 9 8 5 5 5 5 
Flexibility 10 5 5 5 5 5 
Learning Curve with SW 8 7 5 5 5 5 
Maturity of Models 10 5 5 5 5 5 
Support 10 10 5 5 5 5 
User Friendly 10 8 5 5 5 5 
Total Score 95 79 50 50 50 50 
       
 Score Key: 10 high, 1 low       
       
       
Categoriy (Sorted by 
Alphabetical Order) Weights (weights need to be agusted but should add up to 100) 
Availability 7      
Capability 10      
Cost 13      
Experience with SW 15      
Fidelity (Validated 
Models) 15      
Flexibility 7      
Learning Curve with SW 7      
Maturity of Models 9      
Support 10      
User Friendly 7      
Total Score 100      
       
 Weight Key: 10 high, 1 
low       
       
       
Modeling and Simulation Software Scored-
Weighted     
Software 
Categoriy (Sorted by 
Alphabetical Order) Excel Arena SIMIO MATLAB ExtendSim OPEmCSS 
Availability 70 70 35 35 35 35
Capability 80 80 50 50 50 50
       73
 Cost 130 130 65 65 65 65
Experience with SW 150 120 75 75 75 75
Fidelity (Validated 
Models) 135 120 75 75 75 75
Flexibility 70 35 35 35 35 35
Learning Curve with SW 56 49 35 35 35 35
Maturity of Models 90 45 45 45 45 45
Support 100 100 50 50 50 50
User Friendly 70 56 35 35 35 35
Total Score 951 805 500 500 500 500
 
Since Excel and Arena received the highest scores, they were selected as the primary 
emulation software packages for the development of the simulation models. 
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 Appendix D – Modeling and Simulation Results 
          1. Base Case Light Results 
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 492.68IEW Transition 272.22 3.10 151.73
158.98
IEW Engagement 363.71 2.57 252.29 499.09
IEW CHARGE 108.99 0.91 73.3816






IEW Transition 1.5576 < 0.01 0.9852
1.0330 0.00000824 17.8759
IEW Engagement 2.0820 < 0.00 1.8798 2.2821 0.00 6.8520
IEW CHARGE 0.8095 < 0.00 0.6367
0.3627 0.00 16.9788








IEW CHARGE 0.1855 < 0.00 0.08650194
2.4667 0.00000007 83.6874








IEW Transition 1.5576 < 0.01 0.9852
0.7814 0.00000725 10.9273
IEW Engagement 2.0820 < 0.00 1.8798 2.2821 0.00 6.8520
IEW CHARGE 0.6240 < 0.00 0.4785
Process
Time per Entity
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 236.00IEW Transition 174.70 1.18 122.00
236.00
IEW Engagement 174.70 1.18 122.00 236.00






IEW Transition 174.70 1.18 122.00
236.00
IEW Engagement 174.71 1.18 122.00 236.00







IEW CHARGE 32.4820 0.54 14.3593
Process
Accumulated Time
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 1347.19IEW Transition 942.95 7.52 616.26
528.16
IEW Engagement 1252.57 8.18 902.06 1629.51
IEW CHARGE 376.43 2.60 250.63






IEW Transition 1.5646 < 0.01 1.1925
7.7203 0.00000518 57.8794
IEW Engagement 2.0779 < 0.00 1.9418 2.2192 0.00 6.7579
IEW CHARGE 6.8625 < 0.01 6.2011
7.0631 0.00 56.9701








IEW CHARGE 6.2380 < 0.01 5.6177
2.0114 0.00000000 118.87








IEW Transition 1.5646 < 0.01 1.1925
0.7038 0.00000313 11.6606
IEW Engagement 2.0779 < 0.00 1.9418 2.2192 0.00 6.7579
IEW CHARGE 0.6246 < 0.00 0.5299
Process
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 776.00IEW Transition 602.80 3.87 435.00
776.00
IEW Engagement 602.81 3.87 435.00 776.00
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IEW CHARGE 3761.35 25.95 2532.27
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 468.51IEW Transition 272.61 2.97 148.37
172.17
IEW Engagement 363.60 2.56 237.99 525.20
IEW CHARGE 109.08 0.94 60.7714






IEW Transition 1.5614 < 0.01 0.9864
1.0052 0.00000343 22.5159
IEW Engagement 2.0820 < 0.00 1.8524 2.3909 0.00 6.8495
IEW CHARGE 0.7350 < 0.00 0.5203
0.3393 0.00 22.4313








IEW CHARGE 0.1105 < 0.00 0.03795713
2.3256 0.00000000 75.4940








IEW Transition 1.5614 < 0.01 0.9864
0.8358 0.00000343 11.3603
IEW Engagement 2.0820 < 0.00 1.8524 2.3909 0.00 6.8495
IEW CHARGE 0.6245 < 0.00 0.4535
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IEW Transition 174.63 1.17 118.00
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 886.56IEW Transition 544.42 4.96 320.82
304.59
IEW Engagement 724.31 4.94 491.18 1015.35
IEW CHARGE 217.35 1.64 146.87






IEW Transition 1.5627 < 0.01 1.1771
2.6628 0.00000064 34.0714
IEW Engagement 2.0791 < 0.00 1.9187 2.2876 0.00 6.6394
IEW CHARGE 2.0949 < 0.01 1.6104
1.9975 0.00 32.9534








IEW CHARGE 1.4708 < 0.01 1.0530
2.1332 0.00 75.4940








IEW Transition 1.5627 < 0.01 1.1771
0.7784 0.00000064 11.3603
IEW Engagement 2.0791 < 0.00 1.9187 2.2876 0.00 6.6394
IEW CHARGE 0.6241 < 0.00 0.4984
Process
Time per Entity
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 0.04478641
IEW 2 0.03074702 0.00 0.01995501 0.04503830
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Maximum
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 243.00
IEW 2 174.19 1.20 113.00 255.00
IEW 1 174.17 1.19 126.00
Resource
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 1456.13IEW Transition 942.46 7.92 572.21
564.78
IEW Engagement 1253.83 8.60 831.89 1821.90
IEW CHARGE 374.86 2.81 221.36






IEW Transition 1.5622 < 0.01 1.2221
5.5791 0.00000787 60.8307
IEW Engagement 2.0788 < 0.00 1.9701 2.2390 0.00 6.9541
IEW CHARGE 4.8199 < 0.02 4.0730
4.9514 0.00 59.4301








IEW CHARGE 4.1986 < 0.01 3.4841
2.0357 0.00000000 130.14








IEW Transition 1.5622 < 0.01 1.2221
0.7118 0.00000367 12.2331
IEW Engagement 2.0788 < 0.00 1.9701 2.2390 0.00 6.9541
IEW CHARGE 0.6213 < 0.00 0.5318
Process
Time per Entity
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 864.00IEW Transition 603.12 4.06 382.00
864.00
IEW Engagement 603.12 4.06 382.00 864.00






IEW Transition 603.12 4.06 382.00
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IEW Engagement 603.15 4.06 382.00 864.00







IEW CHARGE 2534.51 20.24 1578.31
Process
Accumulated Time
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ValueAverage Half Width
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IEW 2 0.05367589 0.00 0.03509118 0.08161174






IEW 2 0.6847 < 0.00 0.6767 0.6902 0.00 1.0000










IEW 2 0.03673911 < 0.00 0.02422065
Maximum
ValueAverage Half Width








IEW 2 0.03673911 < 0.00 0.02422065 0.05522418 0.00 1.0000
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IEW 2 301.19 2.08 190.00 446.00
IEW 1 301.96 2.07 192.00
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HITL ESRs in Sys 0.2620 < 0.00 0.1748
0.00 0.00 0.00
HITL ESR Tot time 4.1117 < 0.02 3.0056 5.3490 0.00 18.2616


















Values Across All Replications
HITL IEW Analysis
Replications: 1,000 Time Units: Seconds






















       103






Replications: 1,000 Time Units: Seconds
Category Overview
Values Across All Replications
Key Performance Indicators
10:48:53 November 8, 2009
 
       104
 Maximum
ValueAverage Half Width






































0.00 < 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.00 0.00
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HK Assess 304.63 1.07 230.55 378.78
HITL Delay 0.00 0.00
< 0.52 34.7856 91.0537 0.00376410
1029.08
Accumulated Time











45.1863 < 0.36 26.3236 71.5458 0.00062110 513.93
HITL Delay 0.00 < 0.00 0.00 0.00
EW Engage








EW Engage 45.1863 < 0.36 26.3236 513.93
HITL Delay
91.0537 0.00376410 742.82
HK Assess 6.0039 < 0.02 5.0365 7.2212 2.0002 9.9999
HK Engage 59.8786 < 0.52 34.7856
Process
Time per Entity
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HK Engage 50.7220 0.07 42.0000 57.0000
Queue
HK Assess 50.7380 0.07 42.0000
108.00







HK Engage 50.5350 0.08 42.0000
57.0000
HK Assess 50.7220 0.07 42.0000 57.0000







EW Engage 64.2740 0.78 22.0000
Time Units: Seconds
Category Overview
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 0.00
System 2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
System 1 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.00
HK System 2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
HK System 1 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.00




System 2 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.00
System 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
HK System 2 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.7000 0.00
HK System 1 0.00 0.00









1.0000 < 0.00 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
HK System 2 1.0000 < 0.00 1.0000














System 2 0.00 < 0.00 0.00
< 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00














System 2 0.00 < 0.00 0.00
0.00 0.00 0.00
HK System 2
HK System 1 0.00 < 0.00 0.00
Maximum
ValueAverage
System 1 0.00 < 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.000.00 0.00









0.00 < 0.00 0.00
Category Overview
IEW Analysis
Replications: 1,000 Time Units: Seconds
November 8, 200910:48:53 
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 Base Pct Hit 0.7381 0.00 0.6220 0.8812
























Count HK Miss 15.0970 < 0.20 6.0000
150.00
Count HK Hit 35.6410 < 0.21 24.0000 46.0000
Count EW FSR 85.0900 < 1.24 24.0000
50.0000
Count EW Engagement 64.2140 < 0.78 22.0000 108.00
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HK Assess 305.20 1.12 246.01 359.56
HITL Delay 235.34 0.62
< 0.53 36.9892 88.4025 0.00290820
1045.86
Accumulated Time











45.0077 < 0.34 29.5852 63.7989 0.00062110 513.93
HITL Delay 4.6557 < 0.01 4.1656 5.1320
EW Engage








EW Engage 45.0077 < 0.34 29.5852 513.93
HITL Delay
88.4025 0.00290820 694.08
HK Assess 6.0134 < 0.02 4.9202 7.1577 2.0002 9.9997
HK Engage 59.4709 < 0.53 36.9892
Process
Time per Entity








Values Across All Replications
IEW Analysis
Replications: 1,000 Time Units: Seconds
4.1656 5.1320 2.0098 7.9724
Category Overview10:53:08 November 8, 2009
  













HK Engage 50.7340 0.07 41.0000 57.0000
Queue
HK Assess 50.7540 0.07 41.0000
103.00







HK Engage 50.5520 0.07 42.0000
57.0000
HK Assess 50.7340 0.07 41.0000 57.0000







EW Engage 65.0490 0.78 28.0000
Time Units: Seconds
Category Overview
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 0.00
System 2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
System 1 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.00
HK System 2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
HK System 1 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.00




System 2 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.00
System 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
HK System 2 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.7000 0.00
HK System 1 0.00 0.00









1.0000 < 0.00 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
HK System 2 1.0000 < 0.00 1.0000














System 2 0.00 < 0.00 0.00
< 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00














System 2 0.00 < 0.00 0.00
0.00 0.00 0.00
HK System 2
HK System 1 0.00 < 0.00 0.00
Maximum
ValueAverage
System 1 0.00 < 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.000.00 0.00









0.00 < 0.00 0.00
Category Overview
IEW Analysis
Replications: 1,000 Time Units: Seconds
November 8, 200910:53:08 
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 Base Pct Hit 0.7388 0.00 0.6410 0.8585
























Count HK Miss 15.0740 < 0.21 6.0000
159.00
Count HK Hit 35.6800 < 0.21 25.0000 47.0000
Count EW FSR 86.0530 < 1.23 32.0000
57.0000
Count EW Engagement 65.0040 < 0.78 27.0000 103.00







Values Across All Replications
IEW Analysis
Replications: 1,000 Time Units: Seconds
Category Overview10:53:08 November 8, 2009
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Replications: 1,000 Time Units: Seconds
Category Overview
Values Across All Replications
Key Performance Indicators
10:56:44 November 8, 2009
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 Maximum
ValueAverage Half Width






































0.00 < 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.00 0.00





















































Values Across All Replications
IEW Analysis
Replications: 1,000 Time Units: Seconds
Category Overview10:56:44 November 8, 2009
 






HK Assess 304.98 1.11 257.04 370.42
HITL Delay 353.25 0.94
< 0.51 37.5965 88.0577 0.00290820
1224.24
Accumulated Time











44.9560 < 0.35 28.3885 66.7099 0.00062110 513.93
HITL Delay 6.9846 < 0.02 6.2071 7.7426
EW Engage








EW Engage 44.9560 < 0.35 28.3885 513.93
HITL Delay
88.0577 0.00290820 742.82
HK Assess 6.0057 < 0.02 5.0075 7.1234 2.0002 9.9997
HK Engage 59.6150 < 0.51 37.5965
Process
Time per Entity








Values Across All Replications
IEW Analysis
Replications: 1,000 Time Units: Seconds
6.2071 7.7426 3.0147 11.9587
Category Overview10:56:44 November 8, 2009
 













HK Engage 50.7660 0.07 41.0000 57.0000
Queue
HK Assess 50.7800 0.07 41.0000
105.00







HK Engage 50.5770 0.07 42.0000
57.0000
HK Assess 50.7660 0.07 41.0000 57.0000







EW Engage 65.0350 0.80 28.0000
Time Units: Seconds
Category Overview
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 0.00
System 2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
System 1 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.00
HK System 2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
HK System 1 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.00




System 2 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.00
System 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
HK System 2 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.7000 0.00
HK System 1 0.00 0.00









1.0000 < 0.00 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
HK System 2 1.0000 < 0.00 1.0000














System 2 0.00 < 0.00 0.00
< 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00














System 2 0.00 < 0.00 0.00
0.00 0.00 0.00
HK System 2
HK System 1 0.00 < 0.00 0.00
Maximum
ValueAverage
System 1 0.00 < 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.000.00 0.00









0.00 < 0.00 0.00
Category Overview
IEW Analysis
Replications: 1,000 Time Units: Seconds
November 8, 200910:56:44 
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 Base Pct Hit 0.7375 0.00 0.6346 0.8585
























Count HK Miss 15.1130 < 0.21 4.0000
158.00
Count HK Hit 35.6670 < 0.21 27.0000 48.0000
Count EW FSR 86.2170 < 1.25 33.0000
53.0000
Count EW Engagement 64.9820 < 0.80 27.0000 105.00







Values Across All Replications
IEW Analysis
Replications: 1,000 Time Units: Seconds
Category Overview10:56:44 November 8, 2009
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 Appendix E – Team Introduction and Composition 
The team is comprised of six students from the Naval Postgraduate School Masters of 
Science in Systems Engineering Cohort 311.  The team consists of Mr. Matthew P. Artelt, Mr. 
Gerardo “Jerry” Gamboa and Mrs. Sarah E. Hentges from the Naval Air Warfare Center, 
Weapons Division, China Lake (NAWCWD-CL), Lieutenant Commander (LCDR) Nicholas E. 
Andrews from Carrier Strike Group (CSG) 12, Mr. Roscoe A. “Rocky” Smith from the Naval 
Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren Division (NSWCDD) and Mr. Dereck D. Wright from the 
Naval Surface Warfare Center, Corona Division (NSWCCD). 
Mr. Artelt is an electronics engineer with the Weapons Electromagnetic Environmental 
Effects (E3) Branch at NAWCWD-CL.  He is the E3 Integrated Product Team (IPT) lead for 
several major Naval weapons programs.  For this project, he was the deputy program manager 
(PM), assistant scheduler, the assistant program manager for logistics (APML), a risk board 
member, and a researcher. 
Mr. Gamboa is an electrical engineer with the Weapon Systems Analysis Branch at 
NAWCWD-CL.  He is involved in infrared (IR) performance M&S for AIM-9X Sidewinder and 
Joint Air-to-Ground Missile (JAGM).  For this project, he was the lead modeler, configuration 
manager, and a risk board member. 
Mrs. Hentges is a computer scientist at NAWCWD-CL.  At the start of this project she 
was a member of the flight software IPT for Tomahawk missile systems; however, she has 
recently transitioned to a branch head position within the Software Integration Modeling and 
Simulation (SIMS) Branch.  For this project, she was the PM, a risk board member, and a 
researcher. 
LCDR Andrews is an Information Professional Officer and P-3 Orion pilot in the United 
States Navy (USN).  He is currently assigned as the communications officer (COMMO) for 
Carrier Strike Group 12 stationed at Norfolk Virginia.  For this project, he was the principal for 
safety, a modeler, a risk board member, and a researcher, as well as being the primary interface 
to the stakeholders. 
Mr. Smith is a systems engineer supporting Program Manager – Air (PMA) 280 and the 
Tomahawk Weapon System (TWS).  He is a 23-year USN veteran and has 12 years of 
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 experience with Tomahawk.  For this project, he was the risk manager, a risk board member, and 
a researcher. 
Mr. Wright is a computer engineer and analyst with the shipboard reliability and 
maintenance group at NSWCCD, focusing on the AN/SPY-1 radar and MK99 Fire Control 





Figure 23:  Team Hierarchy 
This figure shows the hierarchy and task breakdown of the team. 
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